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The origin of the American riparian doctrine of water use, whereby
each owner of land upon the banks of a watercourse has the right to
make a reasonable use of the water, is customarily placed shortly after the
year 1825. Traditionally, the creation of the riparian doctrine has been
ascribed to two of the greatest early American jurists, Joseph Story' and
James Kent.2
In 1826 there came before Joseph Story, sitting as a judge in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island, the case
of Tyler v. Wilkinson.3 This case, described by Justice Story as "a very
important case, complicated in facts and voluminous in testimony," in-
volved the right of certain mill owners to divert water from the Pawtucket
River through a trench; the complainants were other mill owners who
owned mills on the river, and who challenged this diversion as being
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri; B.A., Millikin University,
1953; LL.B., Washington University, 1956; S.J.D., University of Michigan, 1958.
The basic research for this article was done as part of a water law project of the
Legislative Research Center of the University of Michigan Law School.
1. Joseph Story was born in Massachusetts in 1779, graduated from Harvard
and was admitted to the bar in 1801. He served several years in the Massachusetts
legislature, and was a representative in Congress for a few months in 1808-09. In
November 1811, when Story was but thirty-two, he was appointed by President
James Madison to the United States Supreme Court, where he remained until his
death in 1845. During his nearly thirty-four years on the Court, Story played a
great part in developing the scope and power of the federal judiciary. In addition
to his judicial activities, Story was from 1829-45 a law professor at Harvard, and
wrote many articles and valuable treatises, including landmark works on the Con-
stitution, conflict of laws, equity and agency.
2. James Kent was born in New York in 1763, graduated from Yale and
began the practice of law in 1785. He served as a law professor at Columbia Col-
lege from 1793-98, and again after 1822. He served on New York's highest court
from 1798-1814, the last ten years as chief justice. In 1814 Kent was appointed
Chancellor of New York, a position he held until 1823, when he resigned and re-
turned to his position as a law professor at Columbia. His chancery decisions were
highly regarded, and contributed greatly to the development of American equity
law. Certainly his outstanding contribution, however, was his Commentaries. Kent
died in New York in 1847.
3. 24 Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
(60)
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injurious to their mills. Justice Story wrote an elaborate opinion, in which
he discussed at length the rights of riparian owners, the effect of prior
use of the water, and the acquisition of prescriptive rights through exclusive
uninterrupted use for more than twenty years. He rejected the notion
that simple prior use alone gives any right to the water, holding that
each riparian owner has a right to a reasonable use of the water, provided
such use is not "positively and sensibly injurious" to the rights of other
riparian owners. The case was ultimately decided on the basis that the
diverting mill owners had a prescriptive right to their diversion, and
further that the whole matter had been settled and compromised through
a written agreement executed by the parties' predecessors. But the under-
lying legal principle was clear: each riparian had a right to a reasonable
use of the water.
The Tyler opinion was handed down in 1827. The following year,
James Kent published the third volume of the first edition of his Commen-
taries on American Law, in which he cited Tyler v. Wilkinson in his
discussion of water rights, and stated the rule to be that:
All that the law requires of the party, by or over whose land
a stream passes, is, that he should use the water in a reasonable
manner, and so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially
diminish, or affect the application of the water by the proprietors
below on the stream.4
Kent's Commentaries became an American counterpart of Blackstone,
and over the succeeding years of the century passed through more than
a dozen editions.5 Particularly in the area of property law, this treatise
had a substantial effect upon the development of American law throughout
the nineteenth century. The principle of reasonable use was again set
forth in 1838 by Story in Webb v. Portland Manufacturing Co.,G and
thereafter was adopted by the courts of the eastern states.
Taken together, then, Story's opinion and Kent's treatise mark the
inception of the "reasonable use" doctrine of riparian rights in American
law. This doctrine represents a substantial advance over earlier American
and English law, and viewed in any dimension is a remarkable achieve-
ment. But the doctrine did not spring full-blown from the minds of Story
4. 3 KEr, COMMENTARIES 354 (1st ed. 1828).
5. Perhaps the most notable of the later editions is the twelfth, published in
1873 and edited by a young Boston attorney, 0. W. Holmes, Jr., who later
achieved a certain prominence as a judge and scholar.
6. 29 Fed. Cas. 506 (No. 17,322) (C.C.D.Me. 1838).
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and Kent; it was merely a blending, a culmination of their learning, which
in turn derived from generations of legal experience, partly in America,
but for the most part upon the European continent.
Both Story and Kent drew heavily upon the civil law in promulgat-
ing the reasonable use doctrine. Kent cites in his Commentaries the Code
Napoleon, which had become the law of France in 1804; and although
Story's opinion cites no civil law source directly, it is strongly flavored
with the approach suggested by the Code Napoleon. The provisions of
the Code Napoleon (also known as the Code Civil) do not spell out the
concept of reasonable use, but do reach the threshold of the doctrine by
indicating that disputes between riparians should be determined upon
the particular merits of each individual case, according to a general
standard. 7 Yet the Code Napoleon was itself not a radical departure from
earlier French law, but largely a reflection of civil law thought dating
back at least as far as the Code and Institutes of Justinian, published in
533-34 A.D.
But it was not the civil law alone which provided the elements of
the reasonable use doctrine. In addition to their knowledge of the civil
law, Story and Kent drew heavily upon centuries of common law experi-
ence and development. It must, of course, be kept in mind that these
American jurists did not simply adopt an English common law doctrine.
The reasonable use test was decidedly not English in its origin. Indeed,
it was 1851 before the Court of Exchequer 8 adopted the riparian doctrine,
and in so doing it cited both Kent and Story as authority. On the other
hand, equal care must be taken to avoid the unfortunate conclusion that
the common law background had little or nothing to do with the American
adoption of the riparian doctrine."
English water use law prior to 1825 demonstrates to a substantial
degree how English courts and legal writers groped and struggled across
the centuries in an effort to reconcile the conflicting interests of various
classes of persons in the use of the rivers and streams of their land. As
new problems developed due to the growth of population, commerce and
7. See, e.g., CODE NAPOLEON art 645, Code Civil art. 645 (Dalloz 1955).
8. Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. ch. 1851).
9. After the Revolution, and particularly after the war of 1812, there
existed in the United States a high degree of antipathy to all things British. It
cannot be denied that American legislation and judicial decisions were often
strongly affected by this popular feeling. Yet it is surely an overstatement to
assert that Americans were not acutely aware of, and often favorably influenced
by, the actions of Paarliament and the English courts.
[Vol. 28
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manufacturing, English jurists worked within the framework of the existing
legal system-a system which gave high status to property rights-in
an effort to develop water use doctrines consistent with the general fabric
of English law. In this, they displayed a considerable amount of ingenuity
and achieved a fair measure of success. The law which they declared con-
tained many of the elements of the riparian doctrine, but in an embryonic
state. The great contribution of Story and Kent was to tie together
the loose ends of the existing common law by means of the reasonable use
test derived in large part from the Code Napoleon and its forerunners.
Ir. EARLIEST TImEs
English law relating to the use of the water of rivers and lakes is
fairly uncertain prior to the time of the Norman conquest. It is true that
for a period at the beginning of the Christian era the British Isles were
under Roman domination and experienced the tenets of Roman law; but
very little is known of English water use law of this period, and in any
case the early Roman law had little effect upon the law of later centuries.
Nor does much remain from the early Anglo-Saxon period, with the
exception of scattered references in laws or charters of the kings. There is
merely enough to indicate that the value of watercourses for navigation
and for powering mills was recognized, and that one holding land upon
which a watercourse flowed had a right, apparently, not to have the
watercourse diverted.1o Other than this and an occasional reference to
"water dues,"1' which probably referred to a toll for navigation rather
than for consumptive use of water, there is little to indicate what water
use law existed in England prior to 1066.
This apparent lack of comprehensive legal regulation of the use of
watercourses is doubtless due to the nature of pre-conquest English civiliza-
tion. Society was extremely decentralized, consisting of a number of
virtually autonomous principalities each governed by its local lord. The
king had but a small measure of control over these lords, who in most
cases supported him only when it was clearly in their personal interest to
10. A decree of King Edgar, about 970 A.D., relating to the adjustment
of boundaries between certain monasteries in Winchester, assigned two mills to
Abbess Eadgifu in exchange for allowing a watercourse to be diverted. ROBERTSON,
ANGLO-SAXON CBMRaTERs 103-05 (2d ed. 1956).
11. See ROBERTSON, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 159, 175-77, for examples of
eleventh century charters which grant or affirm water dues. That the term probably
pertained to navigation is indicated by the fact that it was used in close asso-
ciation with "shore dues" given for the privilege of landing ships.
1963]
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do so. There was no centralized system of courts, and the king was unable
to legislate for the nation. Laws were for the most part locally created and
locally enforced.
Moreover, the use of watercourses in Anglo-Saxon times was not great,
and the uses which did exist, such as mills and navigation, for the most
part used the water as it was found and did not affect its quantity or
quality. Further, only a small amount of water was consumed for domestic
or livestock purposes. There was enough water for all, and few contro-
versies arose over water use.
When William the Conqueror added England to his Norman domain,
there was no immediate change in the water law of the nation. However,
William succeeded in giving England a more centralized form of government,
and unquestionably the Norman and continental influence upon the shap-
ing of English law thereafter was great.
III. THE EARLY TREATISES: GEANVILLE, BRACTON AND BRITroN
Only after the Norman conquest did England develop a regular
system of courts and lawyers. This development took place gradually over
several centuries, during which there was still a considerable diversity
between the local law and the law of the king's courts. Also, during this
time confusion between secular and religious functions and powers com-
plicated the administration of the law. Our chief sources of legal knowledge
during these centuries are several treatises written by persons who were
closely associated with the courts and administration of the law.
One of the earliest references to the law of watercourses in post-
conquest times is found in those writings which have been denoted Glanville,
and which date from about 1187.12 As with many other early works of
English law, Glanville was principally concerned with the procedural
aspects of the law, and about one-third of its contents consists of
writs issued by the king's court. Further, the work itself provided an
incomplete picture of English law during the twelfth century, since it
dealt only with the law of the king's courts, and ignored altogether the
12. Spelled variously Glanville, Glanvill or Glanvil. Although this work
was for many centuries attributed to Ranulph de Glanville, who was Chief
Justiciar of England under Henry II, its actual author remains unknown. The
work was written in the time of Glanville, however, and has long been known by
his name. PLuchzrr, A CoNcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 256-57 (5th ed.
1956) [hereafter cited as PLUcKNwrr]; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 162-67 (2d ed. 1898) [hereafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITAND].
[Vol. 28
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mass of local law and custom which then prevailed. 13 Among the purpres-
tures, or encroachments upon the public or royal domain, detailed by
Glanville is that of "turning public waters from their right course," which
might involve as a penalty the loss by the offender of his tenement. 4
Unfortunately, Glanville did not spell out which rivers or streams were
"public." However, this reference does indicate that some general interest
in watercourses was recognized and protected in the twelfth century.
A broader view of English law was taken by Henry of Bratton, or
Bracton as he is popularly known,' 5 when at about mid-thirteenth century
he wrote De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae.18 In addition to a wide
use of English law in this treatise, Bracton also relied heavily upon the
Roman law.' 7 This work is remarkable not only for the picture of the
thirteenth century English legal scene which it impaits, but also because
it introduced to the common law two of the principal features of common
law jurisprudence. First, Bracton employed broad legal principles in his
writing; he was concerned not only with English law as it then was, but
also with what he thought the law ought to be, in the light of universal
legal maxims derived from Roman and natural law tradition and elsewhere.
According to Pollock and Maitland, without this approach a treatise the
quality of Bracton's would have been impossible; "some beggardly collection
of annotated writs would have been the best that we should have had from
him."',, Secondly, Bracton brought to legal writing what has since been
the most distinguishing feature of the common law: the use of judicial
decisions as authority for the statement of legal principles. Bracton made
13. PLUcKNErr 256-57; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 162-67.
14. GLANVILLE 9.11-.13 (Beames transl. 1900).
15. See KANTOROwicz, BRAcTONIAN PROBLEMS 14-16 (1941).
16. In this study I have used BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS
ANGLIAE (Twiss ed. 1878-83) [hereafter cited as BRACTONI. Citations are given
in the sequence of book, treatise (where applicable), chapter and section, as
found in the Twiss edition. Thus a citation to BRACTON 1.12.5 means book one,
chapter twelve, section five; BRAcTON 4.1.37.1 means book four, treatise one,
chapter thirty-seven, section one.
17. Sir Henry Maine accused Bracton of appropriating from the Corpus
Juris of the Roman law "the entire form and a third of the contents" of his
treatise. MAINE, AcIENT LAW 79 (Beacon ed. 1963). This is probably something of
an overstatement. Nevertheless, the influence of the Roman law upon Bracton
must be acknowledged. See e.g., 2 HoLDsWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 212-
32 (1909) [hereafter cited as HoLswopan]; 1 MAITLAND, BRACTON's NOTE BooK
9-10 (1887); PLUcKNET 261-62. Bracton was apparently influenced strongly by
the writings of Azo, a professor of civil law at the University of Bologna, who
died in 1230. See MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo (Selden Society 1895).
18. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 208.
1963]
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repeated reference to contemporary cases, some five hundred in all. 19
This use of case law marks an important event in the development of
the common law.20
Bracton followed closely the Roman law in his discussion of public
and private rights in watercourses. Like the Iastitutes of Justinian, he held
that flowing water is common property by "natural right." 21 Similarly, he
wrote that all rivers and ports are public, and that the right of fishing in
these waters is common to all persons. 22 Persons using a river also have a
right to the use of the banks, regardless of whether the real property
constituting the banks is privately owned. 23 Bracton distinguished between
a river, which is perennial, and a stream, which was said to be temporary
in nature and which might be the subject of private property.2 4 In describ-
ing rivers and their waters, Bracton used both the term "public" and the
term "common," but it is difficult to perceive what difference, if any, is
meant between the two.25 Bracton's reliance to a great degree upon Roman
law would tend to indicate that English law at mid-thirteenth century had
not become so sophisticated as to sustain nice distinctions between public
and private rights to the use of watercourses. English law, still deeply
within the shadow of the feudal age when public and private rights were
merged in lord and overlord, was unable yet to separate a so-called "public"
right from its private holder.
19. 1 Id. at 209. In addition to the cases cited in his treatise, Bracton copied
from the plea rolls of his day and annotated some two thousand cases whose result
apparently met with his approval. These labors were discovered only in 1884 by
Sir Paul Vinogradoff, and can have had no influence upon the development of the
earlier English law. See MAITLAND, BRAcroN's NOTE BooK (1887). Bracton's De
Legibus did have a profound effect upon later English jurists, and clearly helped
shape the subsequent development of the common law.
20. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 212-15 (2d ed. 1921),
indicates that for centuries after Bracton, very little reference to prior judicial
decisions was made by either the English legal writers or the courts. This, how-





25. Ibid. Bracton did seek to distinguish in this section between things "pub-
lic" and things "common," but in the Twiss edition of his work the distinction is
quite vague:
Note this difference between what is public and what is common.
Those things are reckoned as public, which are enjoyable by all persons,
that is, which regard the use of human beings alone. But things may be
sometimes termed common, which are enjoyable by all animals.
[Vol. 28
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In a separate portion of his treatise, in connection with his discussion
of the assize of novel disseisin, Bracton set forth much of the English
v ater use law of the period. In so doing, however, Bracton neglected
altogether his earlier differentiation between public and private watercourses.
The assize of novel disseisin originated in 1166 at the Council of
Clarendon, under Henry 11,26 and provided a rapid means in the king's
court whereby a person dispossessed of his free tenement might, by use
of the royal writ and a jury of twelve, be restored quickly to his premises
by establishing (1) that he had been seized of the premises, and (2) that
he had been dispossessed of them.27
For a person to take advantage of the assize of novel disseisin, it was
not necessary for him to have been driven completely from the land; it
was sufficient that he had been dispossessed of a part of it, either through
the direct occupancy of another or by action of some agency under the
control of, or attributable to, another. It is generally in this last sense that
Bracton incorporated much of the early English water law into his dis-
cussion of this assize. Bracton also discussed rights in watercourses in
connection with the assize of nuisance, which provided relief against acts
which were wrongful, but which in themselves amounted to less than a
trespass or an act of disseisin.28
Bracton discussed two kinds of rights relating to watercourses and
their use: rights naturally incident to the ownership of land, and servitudes
created consensually by private persons. Interferences with these rights
fell within the scope of the assize of novel disseisin or its supplement,
the assize of nuisance.
Turning first to those rights naturally incident to the ownership of
the land, Bracton laid down the very basic maxim that "no one may do
in his own estate any thing whereby damage or nuisance may happen
to his neighbour."29 This fundamental legal principle supplies not only the
26. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 145.
27. PLUCKNETT 358-60; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 146. Prior to the creation
of the assize of novel disseisin, the only remedy possessed by a disseised person
was to prove in lengthy proceedings before a feudal court that his title was valid
as against that of his disseisor. Ibid.
28. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 53, 534. See BRAcrON 4.1.45.10 for a discussion
of the choice in a given case between an assize of novel disseisin and an assize
of nuisance.
29. BRACTON 4.1.37.1. The nuisance to which he referred is an "injurious
nuisance," as distinguished from a "just nuisance," for which there is no remedy.
Bracton distinguished between "damage" and "injury," the first concerning the
effect upon the victim, and the second referring to a legal wrong. Thus, there can
19631
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foundation of the law of nuisance, but also the basis for the reasonable
use test of the riparian doctrine. Bracton's age, however, was not so much
concerned with conflict over apportionment of the water of streams for
large consumptive purposes as it was with use of the water in place for
navigation, powering of mills, and the abstraction of relatively small quan-
tities to meet human and animal need. These latter uses removed little
water from rivers and streams, and thereby gave scant cause for com-
plaint of diminution. It follows that Bracton was mainly concerned with
abuses relating to the use of watercourses in situ. Thus he set forth that
a landowner might not create or heighten a pond so as to flood the lands
of his neighbors.8 0 Likewise, it was improper to construct a foss or ditch
which diverted a watercourse in whole or in part, thereby depriving one's
neighbors of water.31 One might, however, divert a stream in any manner
desired for use on his own premises, so long as after use the water was
returned to its "ancient bed" before it reached the lands of another.32 Ap-
parently some diversion of watercourses was not uncommon, for Bracton
also specifically mentioned that it is wrongful for one having no right in
a watercourse to hinder its modification by others.8
Another concern of the thirteenth century was the "cleansing" of
watercourses to keep them in their channels and flowing normally. Although
Bracton made no mention of any positive duty on the part of a landowner
to remove silt or debris from a river or stream, he did indicate that it
was wrongful for a landowner to interfere with the cleansing of a watercourse
by others.A4 Some cleansing of channels was of benefit to all persons, but
too much cleansing could result in the modification of the flow of the
watercourse. Overzealousness in this matter was therefore wrongful, in the
same fashion as other modification or diversion, and the watercourse could
be returned to its "pristine state" by an assize.8"
be, according to the ancient maxim, damntum asque injuria-damage without in-jury. Bracton illustrated this by an example of a person constructing on his land
a mill, whereby he acquires customers who had formerly patronized the mills
of his neighbors. The new mill is certainly a nuisance to the neighbors, and
damages their business, but because it is not injurious-i.e., not prohibited by
law-the neighbors can gain no judicial relief. Ibid.
30. BRAcriON 4.1.37.1, 4.1.44.1, 4.1.45.10.
31. Id. at 4.1.37.1, 4.1.45.9.
32. Id. at 4.1.37.1. It is interesting that Bracton spoke of watercourses as
flowing in their "ancient bed," rather than describing them as following their((natural" course or channel, as a modem writer would tend to do. It is doubt-
ful, however, whether there is any difference in the meaning of the two terms.
33. BRACTON 4.1.45.9.
34. Id. at 4.1.37.1.
35. Id. at 4.1.45.9.
[Vol. 28
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Bracton further recognized a public interest in watercourses, and
that this public interest is entitled to protection by the courts. Accordingly,
Bracton stated that where one upon his own land erects structures which
interfere with the flow of a watercourse or the passage of fish therein, and
in so doing does not inflict actionable injury upon his neighbors, but
does affect a common public interest, he will be required to remove the
structures, because the public interest is preferred to the private lnterest.g
In addition to rights naturally incident to the ownership of land,
Bracton recognized that certain servitudes regarding watercourses may
be created by consensual agreement or by prolonged use over a period of
time. The right to an entire watercourse might be granted, 7 or there might
be created a servitude in the nature of an easement to divert water across
the lands of others to one's own tenement for irrigation or "to serve some
other convenience. " s38 The right to drink and draw water from a watercourse
carried with it a right of free ingress and egress upon the premises where
the source of the water was located. 39 Further, the right to draw water
included the right to cleanse the watercourse from which it was taken. 0
Interference with these servitudes and their appurtenant rights was wrong-
ful, and the assize of novel disseisin or nuisance could be used to terminate
such interference. 41
The light shed on thirteenth century water law by Bracton's treatise
discloses a predominantly rural society in which watercourses were employed
to fill the needs of agriculture and domestic life. Rivers and streams were
used for the most part in their natural location, with occasional diversions
for water power or other purposes. Property rights undoubtedly existed in
watercourses, as one upon whose land a river or stream anciently flowed
had a right to have its water continue to come to his premises for use.
On the whole, there was probably more than enough water to meet the
needs of those upon whose lands the rivers flowed, because rights to use
or partially divert watercourses could be granted freely to other persons.
Although local controversies between water users no doubt arose,
Bracton gave no indication as to how they were to be reconciled in in-
stances where all were making a use of the water which inflicted no positive
36. Id. at 4.1.44.1.
37. Id. at 4.1.37.1, 4.1.43.1.
38. Id. at 4.1.42.
39. Id. at 4.1.43.1.
40. Id. at 4.1.44.1.
41. Id. at 4.1.37.1, 4.1.42.
1963]
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harm upon the others. The treatise is silent as to whether a rule giving
preference to ancient or prior use was followed, or whether a variation of
the principle mentioned earlier, by which no man should act upon his
land to the injury of a neighbor, was employed as a guide for determina-
tion. In short, the water law of Bracton's day, although perhaps adequate
for thirteenth century England, was far less developed than the riparian
doctrine of the nineteenth century.
About thirty-five years after Bracton's treatise there appeared two
other works, both based upon Bracton, which referred to the water use
law of the period. One of these works, known as Fleta, is of obscure author-
ship; written in Latin, it probably was never widely known in medieval
times and was brought to public attention only in 1647, when it was
printed by Selden.42 According to Fleta, the air, the sea, and the shores of
the sea are common, while rivers and harbors and the right of fishing
therein are public.43 A distinction is drawn between things common and
things public by specifying that the benefits of common property extend
only to persons affected thereby, while the benefits of public property may
be enjoyed by everyone.44 It was further stiplated in Fleta that it con-
stituted an invasion of the king's peace to construct in the sea or in fresh
waters purprestures which adversely affected the interests of the king,
whether such interests belonged to the king alone or existed in conjunction
with the interests of private persons. 45
The second thirteenth century treatise patterned after Bracton's De
Legibus is known as Britton. Britton's authorship is as obscure as that
of Fleta,46 but because it was written in the commonly used French
language, rather than Latin, it became at once a highly popular treatise,
and was perhaps more widely read than either Bracton or Fleta. Britton
was written in the form of a code, ostensibly issuing from the sovereign; the
reasons for this novel manner of presentation are unknown.47 Generally,
Britton followed Bracton in detailing the law applicable to watercourses.
Under the heading of tortious nuisances, the treatise described as wrongful
42. PLUCKNETr 265.
43. FLETA 3.1.4 (1685 ed.)
44. Id. at 3.1.5
45. FLrrA 1.20 at 47 (Richardson transl., Selden Society Vol. 72 (1953)).
46 Baldwin, Introduction, BRITTON viii-xi (Nichols transl. 1901).
47. PLUCKNmr 265-66. Perhaps the author of BRITTON, who was unquestion-
ably familiar with the Roman law, was influenced by the Institutes of Justinian.
(Vol. 28
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the raising of a pond so as to flood a neighbor's tenement;4 interfering with
the common right of a neighbor to gain access to a source of water, or to
water his cattle or draw water therefrom; 49 or preventing the cleansing or
repairing of a watercourse which furnished power to a mill.50 Likewise, it
was a tortious nuisance amounting to a disseisin to divert or obstruct a
-watercourse so as to deprive neighbors of its flow. 51
Britton detailed some of the procedure by which wrongs to watercourses
were remedied. At the sheriff's tourn, held in every hundred twice each
year-the hundred being one of the smaller units of medieval governmental
organization in England, originally composed of ten groups of ten families
of freeholders 52-twelve jurors were selected to make inquiry of breaches of
the peace, including instances of any watercourses "stopped or narrowed or
turned from their course."' 53 If such an interference were found, it was to
be remedied immediately, either by the wrongdoer, or, if he refused or
could not be found, then by the jury itself. 4 With regard to servitudes
concerning watercourses, created consensually or by ancient use, Britton
followed Bracton, stating that a watercourse might be granted to a person
or to a tenement. In the case of a grant to a person it was for his lifetime
only, but if made to a particular tenement it was perpetual and an assize of
nuisance or novel disseisin would lie for its interference.55 Rights might
also be created to divert the water of streams and to convey it across
intervening lands to a place of intended use. 0
As to the rights of the public in waters, Britton had little to say.
Apparently some rivers were common, but one must gather this largely
from implication. On the other hand, the air, the sea, the seashore, and
fishing rights in the sea and rivers were expressly said to be common."2
Britton avoided the dual classification of things as "public" and "common"
which proved troublesome to Bracton, and which probably had no founda-
tion in English law, having been abstracted from Roman sources.
48. BRITTON 2.30.3 at 317 (Nichols transl. 1901) [hereafter cited as BRrrroN].
The citations are as follows: Book, chapter, section. The volume number of the
Nichols translation has been disregarded.
49. Id. 2.30.1 at 316; 2.30.4 at 317.
50. Ibid. This is described as equivalent to a direct interference with the
operation of the mill itself.
51. BRrITON 2.30.1 at 316.
52. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 113-16.
53. BRITrON 1.30.2, 1.30.3 at 146.
54. Id. 1.30.8 at 151.
55. Id. 2.30.5 at 318.
56. Id. 2.30.1 at 316.
.57. Id. 2.2.1 at 175.
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The similarities between, Bracton and Britton are manifest; both dealt
primarily with the rural aspects of water use in a time when there was
apparently very little water shortage, other than that caused by an out-
right diversion or obstruction of a stream. Neither was forced to consider
the problems of water law created by a more complex society, such as
limited rights of use, restrictions on situs of use, and the matter of "prop-
erty rights" in the water itself. In a static world where "progress" was an
unknown concept, the principles of ancient custom and use sufficed; Britton
specifically mentioned ancient usage and grant as being the twin bases
upon which rights in watercourses were founded.58
IV. OTHER MEDIEVAL SOURCES
Other sources disclose that in the medieval centuries the watercourses
of England were of concern in three principal respects: navigation, fishing,
and the negative interest in flood prevention.5 9 The chief interest of the
law, therefore, lay in the larger rivers and streams, although the problems
of drainage of fields through small streams-called "sewers" in this early
age-were not neglected. Clearly the main problem with regard to rivers
and streams was to keep them unobstructed, both for the passage of vessels
and the flow of water. Navigation was often impeded or rendered impos-
sible by the great variety of objects and structures for catching fish that
were put into the watercourses by owners of the adjoining land.60 Ecclesias-
tical and other landowners so narrowed navigable channels with kiddies,
weirs, and other devices that large rivers were reduced to passageways as
small as twelve and eighteen feet, and ships could not pass.61 The existing
records testify to the fact that greed in England was not born of the
Reformation; the hale landlords, lay and spiritual, of the preceding cen-
turies were absolutely ruthless in their abuse of public and private right.
Chapter XXXIII of Magna Carta directed that "All kydells for the future
shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout
all England, except upon the sea shore."6 2 But even this served to ameliorate
58. Id. 2.30.3 at 317.
59. On the subject of medieval law and problems relating to watercourses,
reference has been principally made to PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVAL LAW (Flower
ed., 1915, 1923) (Vols. 32, 40 Selden Society) [hereafter cited by its title]. Also,
of considerable aid has been Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400,
1 Am. J. LEG. HisT. 103 (1957).
60. 2 PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVAL LAW 2xiii-xxvi.
61. 1 PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVALLAW 155; 2 id. at xxiv.
62. McKEcHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 343 (2d ed. 1914). The term "kydells"
covered dams, weirs or other barriers in watercourses, which were equipped with
[Vol. 28
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the problem for only a short time. Later statutes also dealt with the ob-
struction of watercourses by fishing devices, both as a hindrance to naviga-
tion"' and as an injury to the fishing industry generally through interference
with the spawning of the fish.64
In addition to this type of obstruction, there existed other obstructions
to the flow of water, which caused flooding of adjoining lands as well as
the hindrance of navigation.65 Some of these obstructions were natural, and
remained and grew worse because of the refusal of the owners of the ad-
joining land to cleanse the watercourses.66 Others were intentional, some for
the purpose of diverting a river to a new channel, 67 and some simply the
natural consequence of filling river beds with fish traps, pilings, and other
structures.68
In areas predominantly low meadow or marsh, adequate drainage was
a necessity. For this purpose, trenches and ditches were dug, and the small
existing streams enlarged to bear the additional burdens of agricultural
drainage. As early as the reign of Henry I (1100-1135), statutes regarding
drainage were promulgated, and thereafter royal commissions were from
time to time appointed to deal with local drainage matters." The problems
here were much the same as with larger watercourses. Obstructions resulted
both from neglect of landowners to cleanse the channels and from inten-
tional acts designed to impede the flow of water. 0 In urban places the
ditches were obstructed by sewage, garbage, and other filth.71 All this of
course resulted in the flooding of meadows and other lands, to the damage
of landowners and tenants. From time to time there seem to have been
suggestions by juries that ditches or sewers be improved or modified, as
nets and other devices to catch fish. Originally the complaint against kiddies was
that they interfered with navigation; in later centuries it was also seen that they
injured the fishing industry. Id. at 344-45.
63. 25 Edw. 3, c. 4 (1350).
64. 12 Edw. 4, c. 7 (1472).
65. On occasion, roads as well as fields were flooded; this was of particular
interest to the king. Murphy, supra note 59, at 112-13.
66. 1 PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVAL LAw 77-79
67. 2 id. at 106; Murphy, supra note 59, at 113.
68. 2 PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVAL LAw 12-13.
69. 2 id. xxvii, xxviii.
70. 1 id. at 218, 269-70, 284-85; 2 id. at 55-56.
71. 2 id. at 32-33. Although the obstruction of the urban Fleet Ditch by
"dung and other filth" was of some concern, lest it endanger the health of the
inmates of Fleet Prison "by reason of the infection of the air and abominable
stenches," nevertheless the chief complaint was that the congestion interfered with
navigation, encroached upon the king's soil, and made an escape from the prison
more likely than if the ditch had been filled with water.
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by relocation,72 but for the most part the concern over drains was merely
in maintaining the status quo through compelling regular cleansing of
channels73 and preventing or removing obstructions.
Other problems arose when millponds occasionally caused flooding of
surrounding lands,,7 and there are recorded several instances of improper
diversion of water from the king's millponds for use elsewhere.75
During the waning medieval years in England, there is little record of
any modification in the law relating to watercourses. Apparently the law
remained much as Bracton and Britton had pictured it: almost wholly
unconcerned with the consumptive use of water, but highly interested in
the use of rivers and streams for navigation, drainage, fishing, and powering
mills.
V. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY WRITERS
By the opening of the seventeenth century, considerable attention began
to be devoted to rivers and their waters. Population had increased sub-
stantially, navigation had become the mainstay of England, and the char-
acter of the English economy had begun to assume an urban, manufacturing
atmosphere, departing from the agricultural isolation of the earlier age.
New interest in the law relating to the use of rivers, however, did
not develop overnight. For example, one of the most famous English legal
figures of the first half of the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke, made
scant mention of watercourses in his Institutes. Coke referred to water
primarily in relation to the ownership of land, to which he applied the
maxim cujus est sol'm, ejus est usque ad coelwum-he who owns the soil
owns to the sky.70 Thus the ownership of land comprehended the ownership
of all water found upon the land77 and applied to running water7 8 as well
as to ponds.7 9
72. 1 id. at 247.
73. According to Murphy, "[This] was an onerous burden to impose upon
the individual landholder." Supra note 59, at 115.
74. 1 PUBLIC WORKS IN MEDIEVAL LAW 28.
75. 2 id. at 117-18.
76. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE 4a, at 198 (Thomas ed. 1818).
77. Ibid.
78. Id. 5b, at 213.
79. Id. 4b, at 199-200. In addition, Coke in his Third Institute, which de-
scribed the criminal law of England, stated it to be a felony to cut through or
break certain dikes, whose destruction might cause the flooding of lands occupied
by numerous persons. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE, c. XLV (1797 ed.).
[Vol. 29
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Coke's failure to deal more thoroughly with the law of watercourses
is understandable if his position in the seventeenth century legal world is
comprehended. As Plucknett says, Coke's "attitude towards English law
was largely medieval"8S°-in writing of the law he was looking primarily
at the bygone past, limiting his subject matter to time-honored legal usage
and form. This, however, is attributable to his defense of Parliament and
the common law against the assertions of James I that law was derived
solely from the monarch, who ruled by divine right. Coke sought to prove
the contrary, that the existence of the law preceded the existence of the
king, and therefore the position of the monarch and his powers were
derived from the law, which stood above the king."' To do this, he sought
to demonstrate that the common law was based upon custom and reason,
and antedated not only the kingship in England, but also both the memory
of man and any historical records that might exist.82
Coke's concept of private ownership of waters was not too far out of
keeping with other seventeenth century writers. Sir Matthew Hale, for
instance, in De Jure Marls, written about 1670, contended that "Fresh
rivers, of what kind soever do of common right belong to the owners of
the soil adjacent." s3 His position was that streams were for the most part
private, except for public and royal rights of navigation and fishing.8 4 In
this, Hale's viewpoint was roughly similar to that of Coke, retaining the
medieval concept of a river as part of the land through which it flowed,
belonging as private property to the owner of that land with only a highly
limited sovereign or public interest attaching therein. However, there exists
80. PLUCKNETT 282.
81. See PococK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957),
especially c. 2.
82. By placing its foundations upon reason and custom, it was possible to
argue that the common law had experienced little or no change since time
immemorial. Coke and his allies and their successors ultimately succeeded in
establishing parliamentary supremacy over the monarch before the close of the
seventeenth century; but one can only wonder what was the total effect of their
doctrinal teachings upon the common law-whether by demonstrating the im-
mutability of the English constitution based upon the common law, they did not
also retard the growth and development of the great institutions of the common
law, particularly that of real property. For the career of Sir Edward Coke and a
description of the legal setting of the conflict between the king and the common
law, see 5 HoLDswoRTH 423-93. A more recent treatment of the same subject is
BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE (1956).
83. HALE, DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM 5 (Hargrave's Law
Tracts 1787). This work was written about 1670 and constituted the first part of
a three-part treatise dealing principally with navigation and shipping.
84. Id. at 6-10.
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between the theories of Hale and Coke a distinction whose implications
should not be overlooked. Whereas Coke considered that all of the water
within the bounds of one's tenement comprised a part of the land, and was
therefore the private property of the owner of the land itself, Hale did not
go so far, stating only that rivers were subject to private ownership. The
difference lies in separating the concept of property in a river-an entity
consisting of a stream of constantly replenished running water flowing in
a designated bed-from that of property in the water which makes up
the substance of the river. Whether Coke or Hale would have subscribed
to such a differentiation is of course problematical. The distinction may be
explained by the fact that Coke was largely concerned with the ownership
of real property and the incidents thereof, while Hale dealt principally
with navigation and shipping and was therefore more interested in the
right of passage than the ownership of the soil or the water.s 5
Not all English legal writers of the seventeenth century were in accord
with Coke. In August 1622 Robert Callis delivered before Gray's Inn a
reading on the Statute of Sewers, 8 which had been enacted nearly a century
before, during the reign of Henry VIII.s8 The Statute of Sewers provided
for the appointment of commissions to investigate drainage in various
parts of the kingdom, and where obstructions or other injurious conditions
existed to take the steps necessary to obviate them. These commissions
originally were appointed for periods of three years, but under Elizabeth
85. This is a distinction largely ignored by later writers, who have cited
Hale as authority for the common law rule as to rights in wartercourses. Hale's
treatise dealt with navigation, shipping and fishing, primarily in relation to
ports and harbors, as well as to the sea. Watercourses were considered only inso-
far as they were useful for navigation and fishing, with passing reference being
made to problems of accretion and reliction as it affected the ownership of the
bed. Hale refrained completely from commenting upon other uses of water and
watercourses; uses for power or domestic or manufacturing consumption are not
within the scope of his work. Therefore, it would not seem unreasonable to con-
clude that Hale's comments were made from a particular frame of reference:
that of a navigator. This would mean that it is neither altogether proper nor
accurate to cite Hale as authority with reference to other uses of watercourses.
In short, although Hale wrote in general terms, his remarks must be strictly
limited to their context, and we should not attribute to Hale any wider scope
than that, as far as -navigation is concerned, rivers "do of common right belong
to the owners of the soil adjacent."
86. CALLIS, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS (1647) [hereafter cited
as CALLIS].
87. 23 Hen. 8, c. 5, entitled "A general Act concerning Commissions of
Sewers to be directed in all parts within this Realm." The original statute was
to be in force for only twenty years, but subsequently by the act of 3 and 4
Edw. 6, c. 8, it was made perpetual, "to be observed and kept for ever."
[Vol. 28
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I this term was increased to ten years.88 Each commission had power to
make necessary inquiries, to fine and otherwise punish wrongdoers, to levy
assessments, to enact local statutes and ordinances, to exercise the sixteenth
and seventeenth century equivalent of eminent domain, and to compel
general obedience to its orders. These commissions were not, however,
originated by the statute of Henry VIII, for this statute merely served as
a kind of general enabling act for the appointment of commissions through-
out the realm; it had for centuries been a practice for the king to appoint
individual commissions when conditions in various parts of the kingdom
warranted. Thus the statute of Henry VIII merely served to expedite the
appointment of commissions, although the fact that it was enacted indicates
that drainage problems in England were on the increase in the sixteenth
century.
Callis spoke from experience, for he had been a member of various
sewer commissions. His remarks dealt primarily with problems of jurisdic-
tion and procedure under the statute, which were so complex as to be
described as "dark and intricate."8 9 However, in the course of his com-
mentary there is much which relates to the status of rights in rivers in
the early years of the seventeenth century.
Callis shrank from Coke's insistence that the person upon whose land
water was situated owned the water as a part of the land; instead, he
believed that there could be no property fixed in running water.90 However,
Callis did not mean that no one had any interest in flowing waters, for
he went on to say:
And therefore I am of opinion, that taking this word Aqua for the
bare running water, there can be no property therein, but as the
same is incident to the soil, taking them two for one, it is drawn
with the property thereof....',
Thus Callis approached very near the modem position that no man has
88. The term was first enlarged to five years by the act of 3 and 4 Edw.
6, c. 8, and subsequently was lengthened to ten years by 13 Eliz. 1, c. 9, which
further provided that if upon the expiration of a commission no new commis-
sion had been appointed, the justices of the peace of the shires in which the
commission had jurisdiction might extend the term for a period of one year.
This would seem to indicate that these commissions assumed a perpetual nature
in many parts of England, and so great was the need for them that any gap in
time without the existence of a commission was to be avoided.
89. CALLIs 8.
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a property in the flowing waters themselves, but simply a usufructuary
interest in them as they pass over his land. 2
Callis divided rivers into two general categories, but not without some
confusion. He was certain, in view of the then recent Case of the Royal
Fisiery of tle Banne,'3 that navigable rivers, as far as the ebb and flow
of the tides extended, were royal, and that their soil was held by the
king,"' who also had various other rights in these rivers, including the right
of fishery.05 On the other hand, Callis made two assertions as to rivers not
navigable, viz., those above the influence of the tides. On the one hand
he called them common,96 a term upon which he did elucidate; on the
other he intimated that they were private.Y' In these rivers, by whichever
name Callis described them, the soil beneath the water was said to be
owned by the one holding the adjoining lands.98 The banks of both royal
and other rivers were privately owned,9  but banks of navigable rivers were
subject to common use by all men in the incidents of navigation. 100
Turning to Callis' interpretation of the Statute of Sewers, it is note-
worthy that the power of the sewer commissioners was not limited to the
royal waters, but extended to all waters, whether royal or private, whose
drainage it was in the public interest to regulate. Thus, although there were
some small watercourses normally not within the jurisdiction of the com-
missioners,10' and generally the commissioners had no power to invade
private lands to cut new rivers and drains, 0 2 nevertheless the commissioners
did have the requisite power to act "upon urgent necessity in defence of
the country, or for the safety thereof, so that the commonwealth be
therein deeply interested and engaged," for the reason that "things which
concern the commonwealth are of greater account in the law, than the
interest of private persons."'02 Callis further declared that the law of
sewers was of "great and urgent necessity and use for the good of the whole
92. See, e.g., 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 15 (3d ed.
1911).




96. Id. at 222.
97. Id. at 54-57.
98. Id. at 87-88.
99. Ibid.
100. Id. at 51-53.
101. Id. at 54.
102. Id. at 67-73.
103. Id. at 78.
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Commonwealth of the Realm."''1 Such statements disclose that the concepts
of common need and public purpose were given high priority in English
law at an early date.
The sewer commissions seem to have had much in common with the
administrative agencies of the present day, although in the exercise of cer-
tain powers the commissions were virtually autonomous bodies, since there
was no judicial or executive review of their actions. The courts, however,
could and did grant relief when the commissions had clearly exceeded their
statutory powers. Thus the commissions, while having power to remove
wrongful obstructions to navigation, had no power to remove obstructions
which, because they had existed since "time out of memory," had become
rightful by the common law, ancient use giving a right by prescription. 1°
Further, one might obtain judicial relief against a decree of the commis-
sioners which commanded the removal or partial abatement of an ancient
and therefore rightful dam, weir, or kiddle. 05
The jurisdiction of the sewer commissions extended only to problems
of drainage and navigation; they had no power over water supply. As Callis
put it, if there were a drought in the town of A while in the adjoining town
of B there existed plenty of water, the commissioners could not divert water
from B to A for the "use of their cattel, or for other household affairs, as
for brewing, washing and such like," although in a similar situation they
might divert water from B to A to aid navigation at A.' 07
The sewer commissions were not the only governmental organs engaged
in water problems in the Stuart period. Turning to a modern account of
the business of the courts leet-local manorial courts under the jurisdiction
of the lords-we find that there were occasional difficulties relating to
diversion or deprivation of water supply, or to instances of flooding or drown-
ing of lands. 08 Complaints of pollution were apparently rare, the public
not yet being aware of the -danger to health from drinking or otherwise
using foul water, but some were made, especially when the polluting matter
choked the watercourse. 0 9
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id. at 206.
106. Id. at 208-09.
107. Id. at 61-62.
108. 1 GARNIER, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANDED INTEREST 374-75 (1908).
Callis' only reference to diversion pertained to a case where the lands of the per-
son complaining of the diversion had been flooded. CALLIS 215.
109. 1 GARNIER, op. cit., supra note 108, at 375.
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In the late sixteenth century there began to appear upon the common
law scene a new source of authority, in addition to treatises and statutes.
This was the age of the reporters, in which written reports of legal deci-
sions began to be compiled and circulated."1o It is true that prior to this
time there had existed the Year Books-beginning in the reign of Edward
I (1283) and terminating in that of Henry VIII (1535)111-in which were
reported from time to time cases dealing with various water problems, and
that many early treatise writers referred to the Year Books as their source
of information concerning medieval English water law. However, there did
not exist before the sixteenth century any consistently accurate or definitive
medium for reporting the decisions of the courts.112
The rise of the reporters coincided generally with the growth of the
principle of precedent, or stare decisis, in the common law. This develop-
ment, of course, depended in large measure upon an accurate system of
reporting court decisions. The earliest law reports did not completely
satisfy this need, since during much of the period before 1750 the reports
were confused, cryptic and incomplete, with the exception of the years from
1537 to 1616 when Dyer, Plowden and Coke were reporting court decisions.
The publication of the law reports also marked a period when Eng-
land was experiencing vast commercial and mercantile development. This
in turn gave rise to new problems in the use of water and watercourses.
Viewed chronologically, nearly all English water decisions contained
in the law reports prior to 1825 fall into one of three widely separated
periods: 1580 to 1640; 1675 to 1710; and 1785 to 1825. In each of these
periods there was a sizable development of legal theory, built upon doc-
trines developed earlier, but with a considerable interpolation of new
ideas. In the intervals between these periods, there are very few reported
water law cases. The historical reasons for this spasmodical development-
or even for the spasmodical fashion in which controversies arose to give a
foundation for judicial development-are not entirely clear. The seven-
teenth century hiatus could be attributed to the civil war; but in spite
of the political difficulties of the age there was no breakdown of the judicial
system. Indeed, some of the most important cases of the old common law
were decided during the height of this conflict. On the other hand, the
110. 5 HoLDswoRTn 355-78.
111. PLUcKNETr 268-73.
112. Id. at 348-50.
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unsatisfactory reporting of decisions after the time of Coke, lasting until
after 1750, may be responsible in part for the absence of reported water
law decisions between those years. Another possible explanation lies in
the history of the economic development of England, particularly with ref-
erence to water resources. It is not unreasonable to surmise that the
cases arose due to conflicts caused by economic development-by the
growth of factories and mills, by the additional domestic consumption
due to increased population and to enlarged per capita consumption, and
by the intensified agricultural practices necessitated by the growth in
population. Especially would this be true of the increase in litigation at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, which came at a period of great
industrial expansion.1 3 Whatever the reason, the fact remains that in
the three centuries prior to 1825, the common law doctrine of water rights
underwent substantial growth during three principal periods. The develop-
ment during each of these periods is traced below.
VII. REPORTED DECISIONS: 1580 to 1640
Although there is little record of important water law decisions
in the first half-century after the termination of the Year Books, several
cases -decided during this period did contain reference to the law of water-
courses. Collectively, they furnish some insight into sixteenth century
English thought on this subject. The 1555 case of Tlrockmerton v. Tracy,11 4
although it involved a taking of cattle, afforded the court an opportunity
to observe that a grant of a stagnum, or pond, carried with it by implica-
tion the land underlying the pond and also a right of piscary in the pond;
likewise a grant of water-presumably a watercourse-included a right
113. On the other hand, there may be some doubt whether the amount and
nature of litigation provides an accurate barometer of economic and social change.
Where an expanding economy exists, and large profits can be made in a relatively
short time by the erection of new facilities, there might seem to be less, rather
than more, litigation. Rather than be caught up in the coils of the judicial
constrictor for many years over questions of water rights, the enterprising
capitalist might well pay "market value" to buy up rights or asserted rights
whose value before an appellate court might be questionable, in order to be
able to proceed with construction of new facilities and production of goods free
of the shadow of impending actions at law. By this theory, it would be in
more settled periods, when time is worth less in terms of dollars and cents,
that litigation would arise most frequently over rights in natural resources, such
as water. But even this approach, if correct, would not completely eliminate
litigation in time of "booms," for there will always arise instances when parties
come to an absolute deadlock.
114. 1 Plow. 145, 75 Eng. Rep. 222 (C.P. 1555).
19631
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of piscary. This, of course, is but an illustration of the principle that the
greater includes the lesser, but it -does serve to indicate that in the sixteenth
century the legal mind envisioned a pond or a watercourse as property
which could be conveyed in the same manner as other real property.
The common law of the sixteenth century was fully bound up with
questions of proper pleading of causes. A limited number of actions existed,
and the plaintiff had to fit his complaint within one of them. The reluctance
of the common law system to break away from its highly formalized
pleading caused the law itself to ossify; the law became certain, but had
little or nothing to do with the justice of individual cases. The chief
issues in dispute, at least insofar as the reported cases indicate, were
matters of pleading, which grew highly abstruse and technical.
A typical example of the English decision of this period is found in
Sly and Mordant's Case, decided in 1579. The entire report of this case
is as follows:
In an Action upon the Case the Plaintiff declared, that whereas
he was seised of certain Lands, the Defendant had stopped a Water-
course, by which his land was drowned, and found for the Plaintiff.
It was moved in arrest of Judgment, that it appeareth upon the
Plaintiff's own shewing, that the Plaintiff hath the Free-hold, and
therefore he ought to have an Assize, but the same was not allowed,
and therefore the Plaintiff had Judgment.11
The parties apparently agreed that to stop a watercourse, thereby causing
it to flood the lands of another, was wrongful; the only issue was whether
the plaintiff had brought a proper action. Was an action on the case proper
here, or should plaintiff have brought an assize of nuisance (or perhaps
novel disseisin)?118 Problems of this nature recur repeatedly throughout
the English cases prior to about mid-eighteenth century. Thus, in Wikes v.
Searle,117 an assize of nuisance brought for diverting most of a water-
course s was found to be proper pleading, and a judgment for the plaintiff
115. 1 Leon. 247, 74 Eng. Rep. 225 (K.B. 1579).
116. It would at first appear that the defendant was arguing for the applica-
bility of an assize of nuisance, which lay for nuisances caused to a freehold; but
upon reflection it is not certain that defendant did not have in mind an assize
of novel disseisin on the basis that the invasion of the water had disseised the
plaintiff. Such an approach is not quite so far-fetched as it may at first blush
appear; Sir Edward Coke, writing a few decades later, observed that "He makes
disseisin enough who does not permit the possessor to enjoy, or makes his enjoy-
ment less beneficial, although he does not expell him altogether." Co. Lrrr. 331.
117. Reported in Luttrel's Case, 4 Coke 86b, 89a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1063, 1065
(K.B. 1600).
118. "[Plro diversione majoris partis cursus aquae.....
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was affirmed. Again, there was no question but that such a diversion
was wrongful. Similarly in Gile's Case,119 -decided in 1586, the issue was
whether the writ in an action based upon the raising of a pond so as
to flood plaintiff's lands should have been qvare exaltavit stagnum or
quare levavit stagnu--both meaning roughly "wherefore he raised (or
heightened) the pond.' 20
Turning to the substantive aspects of English water law about 1600,
the problem most often litigated dealt with the diversion of watercourses,
especially away from millsites. Between 1600 and 1639 there was consid-
erable legal development in this area. Although the cases often pertained
to artificial watercourses rather than natural rivers and streams, the
courts did not generally differentiate between the two types.12'
In 1600, Luttrel's Case 22 came before the Court of King's Bench,
involving an action on the case for diverting the water supply of plaintiff's
mills. The plaintiff had owned two fulling mills, which had stood from
"time whereof memory"; these mills having become "old and ruinous,"
the plaintiff tore them down and replaced them by two corn mills, where-
upon the defendant diverted the water supply. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff's right to the water depended upon prescription, and
that this prescription had been destroyed when the old mills were torn
down. The plaintiff replied that the prescriptive right was to have the
watercourse flow in its ancient course, and that the use of the water
by the mills was only incidental thereto. The court, affirming a verdict
for the plaintiff, held that it was sufficient for the plaintiff to allege that
the watercourse ran anciently to his mills, without specifying the kind
of mills, and that a prescriptive right to such a watercourse was not
destroyed by the rebuilding of the mills. In arguing the case, both plaintiff
and defendant were apparently in agreement that the legal basis for a
right to the flow of a watercourse was ancient use, by which a prescriptive
right was acquired. Under this view, if the plaintiff had not possessed
119. Godb. 58, 78 Eng. Rep. 36 (K.B. 1586).
120. See also Westbury v. Powel, referred to in Fineux v. Hovenden, Cro.
Eliz. 664, 78 Eng. Rep. 902 (1599), where it was held that an action on the
case lay where "the inhabitants of Southwark had a common watering-place,
and the defendant had stopped it." In Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep.
816 (1610), it was said by way of dictum that an action on the case would
lie for pollution of a household water supply. See also Biccot v. Ward, Hob. 193,
80 Eng. Rep. 340 (circa 1620).
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an ancient use in the watercourse, he would not have had a cause for com-
plaint.123
This approach was entirely consistent with the 1583 decision in
Russell v. Handford,22 an action on the case for obstructing the flow of
a stream upon which plaintiff's mill was situated; the obstruction was
caused when defendant built a new mill. The plaintiff pleaded that his
mill was old, but the defendant answered that ab antiquo, the words used
in plaintiff's pleading, was not sufficient to allege a prescription. Defend-
ant claimed that plaintiff should have set out that his mill existed a
tempore cujus contrarii mewija %ominum non existit: from a time of which
a memory of man to the contrary does not exist. The justices were of
the opinion that if the plaintiff had not declared that his mill was ancient,
he could not maintain his action. A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed,
however, on the ground that ab antiquo imparted an ancient mill.
In 1600, therefore, the English rule was that one acquired rights to
the flow of a watercourse only by means of ancient use or prescription-
unless, of course, a grant to the flow could be shown. But in the absence
of a grant, the fact that a man had built a mill and used water to power
its wheel for ten or fifteen years meant nothing; any person might build
a mill higher on the stream, and interfere with the flow of water, or any
stranger might divert the entire supply, and no relief was available from
the courts. This unhappy rule of law discouraged the development and use
of water; where watercourses were concerned, unless uses had existed since
time out of mind, the rule seemed one of strict anarchy.
This nihilistic view of rights to the flow of water was not destined
to be long retained. In 1622 the case of Tke Countess of Rutland v. Bowler 25
was decided, again involving diversion of a watercourse which supplied
a mill. The plaintiff alleged that the watercourse was ancient, but said
nothing about the mill. The defendant, after a verdict for the plaintiff,
moved in arrest of judgment that plaintiff had failed to plead that the mill
was ancient. The motion was denied, the court saying that, so far as a
diversion was concerned, one having an ancient watercourse running upon
his land did not have to justify its continued flow by pointing to an ancient
use. Here, said the court, a new mill would have been protected in the
123. Cf. Moore v. Browne, 3 Dyer 319b, 73 Eng. Rep. 723 (1572), which
involved the tapping of a conduit supplying water for household use; here, too,
ancient use was the criterion of a right.
124. 1 Leon. 273, 74 Eng. Rep. 248 (K.B. 1583).
125. La Countee de Rutland v. Bowler, Palm. 290, 81 Eng. Rep. 1087 (1622).
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same manner as an old one, since the water was following its ancient
course.
The Countess of Rutland case, therefore, marked a slight turn away
from the older rule: it was now necessary only to show an ancient water-
course and a use of the water in order to prevail in an action against a
diverter. But even in this instance it was problematical whether the
court would have protected a moderately old, but less than ancient, mill
against interference from a new mill, where no diversion of the water-
course was involved. Given such a case, the judges probably would have
gone no further than they did in fact go in Countess of Rutland. How-
ever, one may infer from Duncombe v. Sir Edward Randall,2 6 decided some
six years later, that the courts were occasionally protecting uses which
were less than ancient, although the accuracy of such an inference is not
altogether certain. In that decision, involving an action on the case for
diverting and stopping a river, it was held that one who had an ancient
use of a river could not increase that use so as to prejudice other persons.
Unfortunately, the interests of the plaintiff which were invaded do not
appear; conceivably they involved uses as ancient as that of the defend-
ant, in which case Duncombe adds nothing to the development of the
common law as to water use.
A similar course was followed in 1638, in two anonymous diversion
cases decided upon the same day127 The first case involved a supply of
water to a mill, and the second a supply for household purposes and for
cattle. It was held in both cases that as against a diversion by a stranger,
an action on the case may be maintained on a plea of water qui currere
consuevisset et debuisset-which customarily flowed and ought to flow-in
a certain course, without any assertion of a prescriptive right to use the
water. Apparently, the words currere consuevisset were sufficient to estab-
lish that the watercourse had flowed for a long time; but whether this
meant a period long enough to establish a prescriptive right to the water-
course itself, as distinguished from any use of it, is uncertain. "Customary"
things, however, are usually those which have their origin in a time out
of mind.
The following year Sands v. Trefuses128 was decided, and enlarged
substantially upon the concepts of the earlier cases. Sands involved an action
126. Het. 32, 124 Eng. Rep. 320 (circa 1628).
127. Anonymous, Cro. Car. (3 Cro.) 499, 500, 79 Eng. Rep. 1031 (1638).
128. Cro. Car. (3 Cro.) 575, 79 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1639).
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on the case for stopping a watercourse which flowed to plaintiff's mill,
yet there was neither an allegation of an ancient mill nor of an ancient
watercourse. After a verdict for plaintiff, the defendant moved in arrest
of judgment, arguing that the failure to plead a prescriptive right was
fatal to plaintiff's action. The court, however, in what seems to be an
unprecedented move, held plaintiff's pleading "to be well enough, and may
well maintain his action upon the case, being lawfully in possession, and
the stopping of the water is tortious, and a damage to his mill."'1 29 In effect,
the court here held that one using a watercourse had a right not to have
the watercourse diverted, without regard to whether the use was ancient
or the watercourse was alleged to have existed since time out of mind,
at least where the diverter could show no right to do so. 30
During this same period of time, the English courts decided several
other water law cases which served as a basis for future decisions. In
Citalloner v. Tlwmas,13' the Court of King's Bench was presented with
the question of the nature of running water. In the lower court, plaintiff
had brought an action of ejectment de aquae cursu--of running water-to
recover possession of the water in a small stream of which plaintiff was
the lessee. Upon a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant brought a writ of
error, questioning the propriety of plaintiff's action. The judges determined,
in a highly instructive opinion, that ejectment would not lie for running
water, "for non moratur'3 2 but is ever flowing."'133 One could not be put
in possession of running water because it is not constant; nor could livery
of seisin be made of it. In short, running water is not land, but is strictly
sui generLs. The proper action for the plaintiff to have brought was eject-
ment "for so many Acres of Land aqua cooperta?' 13" -land covered by
water-provided, of course, that plaintiff had a possessory interest in
the land underlying the running water. If he had no interest in this land,
but only a right to the watercourse itself, the proper remedy for disturb-
ance of the flow was an action on the case. On the other hand, the court
129. Ibid.
130. The act of the defendant in this case was having "stopped" the water-
course. While this could mean that the watercourse was obstructed, as by means
of an upper mill dam, and the flow of water thereby hindered, it seems more
likely that "stopped" was used in a more absolute sense: an obstruction which
forced the watercourse to find a wholly new channel.
131. 1 Brownl. & Gold. 142, 123 Eng. Rep. 718 (1608).
132. "It does not delay."
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noted, "Ejectment well lies of a Gorce or Pool, for a Praecipe lies for them,
and a Wife shall be endow'd of the Third Part of a Gorce."''1 In other
words, while a pond took the nature of land, no distinction being drawn
in the law because it consisted of water, a watercourse could not be treated
uinder the same heading because it was a wandering, transitory thing lack-
ing the situational stability of a tract of land.1"
The legal nature of a watercourse was further developed in Shury v. Pig-
got,13 7 decided in 1625, involving an action on the case for stopping a water-
course which supplied the plaintiff's domestic uses. 3 , The defendant, in an
ingenious and -diabolical argument before the Court of King's Bench, con-
tended that since the right to the flow of a watercourse was in the nature of
an easement or way, the right would be extinguished by unity of possession;
and because plaintiff's predecessor had owned both the land across which the
water flowed and the land upon which it was used, it was asserted that such
a unity had existed, extinguishing the prescription upon which the plain-
tiff's right to the continued flow of the water depended. 39 The position
taken by the defendant must have troubled the courts; the case was argued
before the Court of King's Bench on three separate occasions. Although it
was apparently felt from the beginning that the defendant's argument
could not be sustained, a reason for rejecting it was hard to find. After
the case had been argued for the second time, Justice Dodderidge ventured
to explain why the plaintiff must prevail, but found himself able to state
only that an uninterrupted flow was a "matter of necessity." 40 At Michael-
mas Term in 1625, the case was argued before all four justices of King's
Bench, who then gave judgment for the plaintiff, distinguishing between
a way, which is actually a part of the land, being created and existing
only in the law, and a watercourse, which "cloth not begin by prescription,
135. Ibid.
136. Cf. Throckmerton v. Tracy, Plow. 145, 75 Eng. Rep. 222 (1555), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 114 su.pra.
137. 3 Buls. 339, 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (1625). This case is also reported in Latch.
153, Noy 84, Palm. 444, and Poph. 169.
138. The watercourse in this case was probably artificial; however, the court
did not draw any distinction upon this ground and presumably would have
decided in like fashion a similar case involving a natural watercourse.
139. At the present day, defendant's argument with regard to an artificial
watercourse would probably be valid since such a watercourse would be thought
of in terms of an easement to convey water. As is pointed out in the text, infra,
however, at the time when Shury v. Piggot was decided the law did not recog-
nize any difference of an essential character between natural and artificial
watercourses, both being controlled by the rule of prescription.
140. 3 Buls. at 340, 81 Eng. Rep. at 281.
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nor yet by assent, but the same doth begin ex jure naturae, having taken
this course naturally, and cannot be averted."141 Dodderidge retained his
argument of "necessity," on the ground that plaintiff needed the water for
his "cattel," but went on to point out that there was an essential difference
between a way and a watercourse. 142 The two other justices were in agree-
ment that a watercourse could not be extinguished by unity of possession.
Given the early seventeenth century legal outlook upon watercourses,
the result reached by the Court of King's Bench in Shury v. Piggot is wholly
imperative. Since in 1625 the courts viewed all watercourses under a
single heading and held that, in the absence of express grant, rights to the
continued flow of watercourses depended upon ancient use, which gave
rise to prescriptive rights, the adoption of the defendant's argument in this
case would have subjected all watercourses to the rule of extinguishment
by unity of possession. The result of such an application would have been
that if A owned a tract of land over which a stream flowed and he conveyed
the upstream half to B, A would thereafter have no right against B to the
continued flow of the water; unless A specifically reserved such a right in
the conveyance, B could divert the stream to whatever uses he wished,
without interference from the courts on A's behalf. 3 The remarkable thing
about this case is that it presented the judges with a legal dilemma, which
they found themselves hard put to resolve without doing violence to legal
tradition and reason. Their answer, based as it was upon a distinction
between a way as a thing existing only in the law and a watercourse as
a thing existing in reality, was not at all satisfactory. So long as it was
insisted that rights to the flow of water were acquired only through the
operation of certain legal mechanisms--i.e., by grant or prescription-and
that these rights were created by the acts of men, it could be argued in
reply that what was being extinguished was not the watercourse, but
simply the abstract right to the continued flow of the water. Similarly,
when a way was extinguished, the law purported to affect only abstract
141. Ibid., per Whitlock, J.
142. After pointing out that a way of necessity was not extinguished by
unity of possession, Dodderidge said: "Another Reason may be drawn from the
nature of Water, the which will naturally descend, and will make a way, for
its passage, if stopped; it is not possible to have such to be extinct by a unity
of possession." Id. at 340, 81 Eng. Rep. at 282.
143. Conceivably, through an extension of this doctrine, the result would.
have been as drastic to other persons upon whose land the stream flowed, although
in all probability other holders of prescriptive rights would have had a right that
the water continue to flow to their lands, unaffected by the extinguishment of
another person's prescriptive right.
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legal rights and said nothing about extinguishing the flagstones which
may have paved the way. Nor was the argument that a watercourse was
a way of necessity wholly acceptable; the natural extension of such a
holding might well have allowed every landowner to plead necessity as a
justification for .digging a ditch over his neighbor's ground to the nearest
watercourse. These problems undoubtedly were substantially responsible
for the subsequent rejection by the Court of King's Bench of the rule that
rights to the continued flow of a watercourse must originate by grant or
prescription. For, as detailed earlier, in 1639 in Sands v. Trefutses the com-
mon law abandoned the doctrine of ancient use in diversion cases, adopting
the rule that possession and use at the time of the diversion were sufficient
to ground an action.
Other cases of the period 1580-1640 dealt with important collateral
aspects, primarily navigation. The leading decision of this nature was The
Case of the Royal Fishery of the Bane,1' " handed down in 1611, which
involved the construction of a royal grant of land adjoining the Banne,
a navigable river. The grantee contended that the right of fishery in the
river had passed by virtue of the grant of adjoining land. The court
noted that a man might have a several interest in a river or in a fishery,
and that such interest could pass by grant. Apparently the parties
were agreed that a non-navigable river-one in which the tide did not
flow and ebb-belonged to the owners of the land where the river flowed,
and that where it flowed between two estates each owner held a moiety,
both of the river itself and of the fishery in it. But because the Banne was
a navigable river at the point in controversy, it was a royal river, in which
the king held a sole interest in the bed and in the right of fishery. The
king's interest arose for the reason that such waters partook of the nature
of the sea, over which the king had clear dominion; rivers were to be
considered as branches of the sea so far as the sea flowed in them. The
court did not doubt that the king could convey his rights in a navigable
river, but held that in this case the right of fishery did not pass by
implication with a grant of the adjoining land, since the royal right was
in no wise an appurtenance of the adjoining land, but existed in gross.
Later in the century, Lord Hale criticized the opinion in The River
Banne, pointing out that a royal river was not a river in which the king
held the sole property rights, as the court assumed, but was a public river,
144. Supra note 93.
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whose use was under the king's special care and protection. The ownership
of the bed, said Hale, was immaterial in determining a royal river, as
was the ebb and flow of the tides; the proper criterion was whether a river
was susceptible of common passage by the public, which put it under the
king's care.24r However, Lord Hale agreed in distinguishing between private
and royal property in rivers upon the basis of the limit of the tide, and
later English cases have followed a similar course.1 46
Under such an approach, the public has a right to navigate upon all
rivers susceptible of navigation, whether royal or private, but the property
interest of the public is limited to a right of passage in the nature of an
easement. This doctrine probably arose from the tendency of the sixteenth
and seventeenth century jurists to conceive of a river as an appendage
either of the land or of the sea, and as such, property owned by the king,
as holder of the sea, or by those holding the adjoining land. Primarily,
watercourses were a part of the land, but by using an analogy to land
highways the public might be accorded a right of passage over them.
In this connection, it seems clear that rivers were looked upon as private
property subject to a public right, rather than as public property subject
to certain private rights. As early as 1581 it was held that persons in
the exercise of a public right of navigation or fishing had no right, without
the consent of the owner, to land upon the banks of a river or to spread
their nets thereon.147 Further, although the owner of adjoining land was
under a duty to cleanse a ditch of silt or obstructions, he was under no
duty to cleanse a river next to his land unless he made active use of it;
but those who had "ease and passage" on such a river did have an active
duty to cleanse it.148 Thus the position of the navigator was clearly delin-
eated: he must remain upon the water and must perform whatever acts
were necessary in order to keep the watercourse open and free. The adjoin-
ing landowners were under no positive duty to aid navigation, although
quite clearly they were prohibited from engaging in positive acts which
interfered with it, such as diverting the water of the river.149 In this con-
nection, navigable rivers were treated as highways, and purprestures, ob-
145. Op. cit. supra note 83, at 8.
146. COULSON AND FORBES, THE LAW OF WATERS 100-114 (6th ed. 1952).
147. Inhabitants of Ipswich v. Browne, Say. 11, 14, 123 Eng. Rep. 985, 986
(1581).
148. Cf. Repair of Bridges, Highways, etc., 13 Coke 33, 77 Eng. Rep. 1442(1609).
149. Hind v. Manfield, Noy 103, 74 Eng. Rep. 1068 (1614).
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structions or other interferences with their use were cognizable by the
king, and criminal sanctions were applicable.
In addition to problems of obstructing and diverting water from mills
and questions of navigation, these early cases also indicate that pollution
was occasionally a problem, the watercourses becoming unfit for household
use or the fish in a river being killed.150 Since domestic consumptive uses
were small and quite often satisfied from wells and springs, there were few
instances of interference with household uses by diversion or obstruction
of watercourses.' 1 - Certainly in the decisions of the courts there was no
indication of any preference to be accorded domestic uses over use of
other kinds.
Summing up, the early seventeenth century judicial mind conceived
of a watercourse as a part of the real property, although it was recognized
that the nature of running water was wholly different from that of
land. The term "common right" was used with respect to watercourses
upon several occasions, but this usually referred either to the public right
of navigation 52 or to the rights of persons owning land adjacent to a
stream.1 3 From the point of view of the public, a right to navigate water-
courses was recognized; the interest of the English nation in ships and
the sea could not be ignored. However, it cannot be asserted that there
was any refined doctrine relating to rights to the use of watercourses. As
late as 1638, the right to use water was based solely upon ancient use, i.e.,
being able to establish the user or his grantor had been employing a river
for a particular purpose from time out of mind. Such an approach can
emerge only from a static society in which change is associated with decay
or disaster. These were meager beginnings; water law was as yet undetached
from its real property background.
VIII. REPORTED DEcISIONS: 1675 TO 1710
After the decision in Sands v. Trefuses in 1639, a hiatus of more
than thirty years occurred in the development of the common law of
watercourses. Although it might not seem implausible to attribute this to
150. Cf. Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1610).
151. But cf. Shury v. Piggot, 3 Buls. 339, 81 Eng. Rep. 280 (K.B. 1625);
Anonymous, Cro. Car. (3 Cro.) 500, 79 Eng. Rep. 1031 (1638).
152. Cf. Repair of Bridges, Highways, etc., suzpra note 148.
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the political disturbances of the age, this notion is proved false by the
fact that the courts quite decidedly continued to function throughout the
conflict. Furthermore, Parliament was not altogether silent during this
period, for quite early in the reign of Charles II statutes were passed de-
claring the Wye, Lugg, Itchen, Avon, and Medway rivers to be subject
to a public right of navigation.154 Therefore, one may assume that in these
years there were few riparian conflicts of any substantial nature.
In the 1673 case of Cox v. Matthews,1"5 Lord Hale aproved by way of
dictum the ruling in Sands v. Tiefuses, saying that where a watercourse
supplying a mill was diverted, the mill owner need not plead antiq uam
molendinum--an ancient mill-but that the issue would hinge upon a
determination of whether the defendant "used to turn the stream as he
saw cause, for otherwise he cannot justify it, though the mill be newly
erected." 50 Thus, the common law in 1673 seemed to be reaching a point
where persons actively using water were able to establish their rights
without having to prove a use time out of mind, through the simple
expedient of requiring anyone disturbing the status quo to prove that he
had a right to do so rather than imposing the burden upon the complaining
party whose use had been disturbed.
During the following decade, in Kebletkwait v. Palmes,'57 the Court of
King's Bench successfully resisted an attempt to reinstate the doctrine
that a right to the flow of a watercourse must be based both upon ancient
use and the continued existence of the stream in its particular bed from
time out of mind. Keblethwait was an action upon the case for diversion
of a watercourse which supplied a mill; plaintiff pleaded that the water had
been turned from its ancient course, but did not allege that the mill was
ancient." s At Common Pleas this pleading was held adequate to sustain
154. 14 Car. 2, c. 14; 16 and 17 Car. 2, c. 12. According to English usage
in dating statutes and other official acts, the reign of Charles II is considered to
have begun when Charles I lost his head in 1649 and not when Charles II
actually assumed the throne in 1660; therefore, although dated 14 and 16 Charles
II, these Parliaamentary acts were passed in 1662 and 1664, relatively early in
his reign.
155. 1 Ventr. 237, 239, 86 Eng. Rep. 159, 160 (1673).
156. Id. at 237, 86 Eng. Rep. at 159.
157. Comb. 9, 90 Eng. Rep. 311 (K.B. 1686). See also the report of this case
in 2 Show. 243, Carth. 85, Skin. 65, 175, 3 Lev. 133.
158. Plaintiff, in referring to the watercourse in his pleading, used the words
ab initio & solito cursu, which the court held to be equivalent to de jure currere
debuisset & consuevsset-that the water of right customarily flowed and ought
to flow in a certain course. The term consuevisset, which referred to the fact
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a verdict for the plaintiff, 1 9 and the defendant brought error in the Court
of King's Bench, where the pleading was held sufficient upon the authority
of the 1622 decision of The Countess of Rutland v. Bowler.'6 ' Lord Holt,
the Chief Justice, dissented, contending that unless plaintiff possessed an
ancient use no right existed:
Suppose a water-course run to my ground, and I have no use for
it, and one, upon another ground, divert it before it come to mine,
will an action lie? Is this not the same, must you not lay some
use for it?6"
Had no use at all been shown by the plaintiff, the other judges might have
agreed with Lord Holt; but they were not prepared to say that the use
must have existed time out of mind before the courts would protect it.
The 1687 case of Glyn v. Nichols,'62 however, presented the Court of
King's Bench with this very problem. The plaintiff brought an action for
the diversion of a watercourse and pleaded neither title to the watercourse,
nor any use thereof save that it flowed over his messuage. It was contended
by the defendant that the declaration was not good, but the court held
for the plaintiff, apparently finding the pleading adequate. The reports of
the case are very cryptic and there is no discussion of the issues, nor are
reasons given for the court's holding. Eight years later, in 1695, the Court
of King's Bench was again presented with a diversion case containing no
allegation that any use of the water by the plaintiff had been interfered
with. In Richards v. Hill, 13 the plaintiff, due to an error in pleading,
removed from the cause the fact that diversion of an ancient stream had
impaired the operation of his mill. As in Glyn v. Nichols, however, the
diversion alone was held to be sufficient foundation for the action on the
case.
Murgatroid v. Law,16 4 on the other hand, decided in 1690, indicated
that it was not wrongful to divert a watercourse from lands to which it
that the water had customarily flowed in a certain course, imparted that the
stream was ancient, or had existed time out of mind, and therefore was sufficient
to found a prescription.
159. Nulmes v. Hoblethwayte, 3 Lev. 133, 83 Eng. Rep. 615 (1683). The
discrepancy in the names is indicative of the inaccurate reporting of these early
decisions; of the half-dozen different reports of this case, no two are precisely
similar and several disclose wide and substantial deviations.
160. Palm. 290, 81 Eng. Rep. 1087 (1622), discussed in text accompanying
note 125 supra.
161. 1 Show. at 64-65.
162. Comb. 43, 90 Eng. Rep. 333, 2 Show. 507, 89 Eng. Rep. 1069 (1687).
163. 5 Mod. 206, 87 Eng. Rep. 611, 1 Raym. Ld. 102, 91 Eng. Rep. 964 (1695).
164. Carth. 116, 90 Eng. Rep. 672 (K.B. 1690).
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had customarily not flowed, and, therefore, one diverting a watercourse
might successfully defend his acts by establishing that it customarily
flowed otherwise than onto the land of the plaintiff."6 5
In Leveridge v. Hoskins,66 decided in 1709, there was some question
whether the plaintiff pleaded that his diverted watercourse was ancient,
but the decision went off upon issues of proper pleading and venue and
adds little to the development of the law of watercourses. The Leveridge
case does, however, raise an important problem which was not answered
in any of these early common law decisions: what is included within the
term "diversion"? A diversion is usually pictured as a turning of a water-
course into a new channel, yet in Leveridge it may have been that the de-
fendant, who abstracted much of the river's water through two ditches, was
making a consumptive use of the water, as for irrigation. Conceivably, then,
a diversion in the understanding of the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
tury legal mind meant any taking of the water which diminished the flow
of the stream.
Problems of pleading in water law cases were still prominent at the
close of the seventeenth century; if anything, pleading had become more
technical than before. The Court of King's Bench was called upon to decide
whether a messuage was the same thing as a tenement, 1 7 and whether a
declaration was sufficient which alleged that water ought to flow to plain-
tiff's tenement, but not that it ever had so flowed.' 68 But the all time high
for technicality must have been approximated in Richards v. Hill, 69 where
a pleading was held bad because the plaintiff, from whose mill a watercourse
had been partially diverted, misspelled a word; intending to use the Latin
"molere," meaning to grind, plaintiff said "molare," which was apparently
not a word at all.
Several cases during this period disclose a continued recognition of
the high public interest in navigation of rivers. Thus it was held both a
public and a private wrong to cut down the banks of the Wye so as to
165. These remarks are strictly by way of dictum, since the defendant in the
Murgatroid case employed improper pleading and lost the decision on those
grounds.
166. 11 Mod. 257, 88 Eng. Rep. 1025 (Q.B. 1709).
167. Scoble v. Skelton, 2 Show. K.B. 195, 89 Eng. Rep. 886 (1682).
168. Jackson v. Savage, Skin. 316, 90 Eng. Rep. 142 (K.B. 1692); the same
case is also reported as Jackson v. Salway, 1 Show. 350 (1692). See also Prickman
v. Trip, Comb. 231, 90 Eng. Rep. 447, Skin. 389, 90 Eng. Rep. 173 (1693), where
the issue was the failure to allege a termininis a quo of a diverted watercourse.
169. Supra note 163.
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interfere with the navigation thereupon.170 Likewise, the unauthorized con-
struction of locks on the Thames, and the charging of a toll for passage
was held to be a proper cause for prosecution by public officials. 17
1
The building of mills and dams inevitably caused flooding cases, often
of considerable local consequence. In 1701, for example, one Policarpum
Wharton was indicted for causing a riot over the construction by a neighbor
of an obstruction in a stream which would have flooded the upstream
lands. '17 2 It was held that Policarpum and his fellows could not employ self
help to abate such a structure while it was being built; they had to wait
until it actually became a nuisance to their lands.- 7 3 The Chief Justice,
Lord Holt, further pointed out that a person who "has a river" is under
a duty to scour or cleanse it, and will be liable if the neighboring land is
flooded due to his failure to act. The typical cause of flooding, however,
seemed to be the result of intentional obstructions, such as mill dams
7 4
or weirs to aid in the taking of fish.1Y5
In the second of these pre-1825 periods, then, the common law under-
went only a moderate development. The courts reaffirmed the advances
made during the previous era, but were apparently not presented with any
novel issues of consequence. Watercourses were still largely looked upon
as incident to the ownership of certain lands, although it had begun to
be recognized that the nature of rivers and streams as an object of property
was singular, and concepts suitable for real property in general were not
always appropriate where watercourses were concerned. Thus it was per-
ceived to be inadequate to say that the freeholders upon opposite sides of
a watercourse each owned half of the river; by the opening of the eighteenth
century it had begun to be accepted that such owners have a common
interest in the river as an entity. The legal notion that rights in a water-
course were freely transferable to strangers was still retained, however.176
170. The King v. Stanton, 2 Show. K.B. 30, 89 Eng. Rep. 773 (1679).
171. The King v. Clark, 12 Mod. 615, 88 Eng. Rep. 1558 (K.B. 1701).
172. The King v. Wharton, 12 Mod. 510, 88 Eng. Rep. 1483 (K.B. 1701).
173. Cf. Kendrick v. Bartland, 2 Mod. 253, 86 Eng. Rep. 1056 (C.P. 1677).
174. See, e.g., Prince v. Moulton, 1 Raym. Ld. 248, 91 Eng. Rep. 1062 (1697).
175. In Courtney v. Collet, 1 Raym. Ld. 272, 91 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1697), the
breaking of such a weir caused the flooding of plaintiff's land and his fish ponds,
allowing his fish to escape down the river. It was held that an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit was proper, rather than action on the case as defendant con-
tended.
176. Cf. Holt, C. J., in The King v. Wharton, supra note 172: "If a river run
contiguously between the land of two persons, each of them is, of common right,
owner of that part of the river which is next his land; and may let it to the other,
or to a stranger."
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The spirit of the age is perhaps typified in the often quoted, but
overly general words of Lord Holt in Tenant v. Goldwinr: 17 "every one
must so use his own, as not to do damage to another."''7 In short, the broad
and grand principles which have always been possessed by the law existed
then; but so far as application to particular cases was concerned, jurists
were still largely groping in the medieval after-dusk.
IX. THE AGE OF BLACKSTONE
By and large, the eighteenth century in England, until its closing
decades, was a time of famine in the common law with regard to water
law decisions. The single exception, the 1747 case of Brown v. Best,"79
certainly cannot be described as applying anything but the principles laid
down in earlier times. The case involved the diversion of water from a
stream into a pit for use in watering meadows and cattle, and was decided
upon the principles of ancient use. Since the defendant had not anciently
used the water in that manner, his use was wrongful insofar as it interfered
with the plaintiff's needs. The Court of King's Bench recognized that a
"watercourse is a quite distinct thing from the land,"'' 0 but clearly found
the time-honored doctrines of prescription to be suitable.
Between 1765 and 1769, Sir William Blackstone published his Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, which were to have an overwhelming
effect upon the common law world for many years to come. Blackstone's
observations relating to the use of watercourses were sparse, but by piecing
them together it is possible to derive a mid-eighteenth century view of
the subject. Water was classified as among those few elements which, by
nature, are susceptible only of being common property, in which persons
can acquire at most a usufructuary right.181, This usufructuary right was
acquired by occupancy and existed so long as the occupancy continued .' 2
Interference with the occupancy of another, however, was wrongful:
If a stream be unoccupied, I may erect a mill thereon, and detain
the water; yet not so as to injure my neighbor's prior mill, or
his meadow; for he hath by the first occupancy acquired a property
in the current.18 3
177. 2 Raym. Ld. 1089, 92 Eng. Rep. 222; also reported as Tenant v. Gouldwin,
3 Raym. Ld. 324, 92 Eng. Rep. 712 (1705).
178. 2 Raym. Ld. at 1092, 92 Eng. Rep. at 224.
179. 1 Wils. K.B. 174, 95 Eng. Rep. 557 (1747).
180. Id. at 175, 95 Eng. Rep. at 558, per Dennison, J.
181. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 14.
182. Ibid.
183. 2 id. at 403.
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Further, although water was a "species of land," nevertheless Blackstone
recognized that it was also a "movable, wandering thing," in which a person
could only have a "temporary, transient, usufructuary property," and for
this reason an action to recover possession of water or a river was not
proper, but rather should be to recover certain land covered with water.18 4
Thus, Blackstone rejected the test of ancient use as determining rights
to the use of watercourses, and substituted therefor a doctrine of strict
prior use. In doing so, it was necessary to strike a balance between the
natural advantage possessed by the upstream owner'8 5 and the legal ad-
vantage which had theretofore been afforded persons whose uses had existed
time out of mind.
In solving this problem, Blackstone first said that water was common
property, but that certain private property might be acquired in it through
occupancy. This private property was to last only so long as the occupancy
continued. Unquestionably, when Blackstone used "occupancy," he did so
in the sense of a taking of possession to at least a limited extent. Certainly,
there could be no constructive occupancy; a man in Scotland could not
occupy water of the Thames simply by willing it, but was required to
travel to England and perform acts of a character sufficient to constitute
occupancy. By this concept, water flowing in a stream could be "occupied"
by the act of putting a bucket into the stream and abstracting some of
the water. However, only the water in the bucket would actually be
occupied by such an act; the remaining water in the stream would still
be common property, and subject to occupation by other persons for their
own use.
A system of this nature would, of course, put a premium upon being
able to get as close to the head of the stream as possible, in order to take
water before anyone else got it. Any orderly use of the water would be
rendered impossible. To avoid this, Blackstone added a new principle to
his doctrine: a watercourse might be occupied by a person in the same
manner as individual molecules of water might become private property by
occupancy. Thus if A builds a mill upon the river Wye, B may not sub-
184. 2 id. at 17.
185. The upstream user would, of course, have the advantage of having the
first opportunity to use the stream, whether by consuming the water, polluting it,
or damming it for power or other purposes. About the only time the upper owner
would be adversely affected by a downstream use would be when the lower owner
constructed a dam which obstructed the stream and caused the water to flow back
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sequently take water from the Wye above A's mill in such quantities as to
interfere with the operation thereof. Although by no means can it be said
that A's act of building a mill constitutes occupancy of all of the molecules
of water in the river Wye before they come down to his mill, A has acquired
a property interest in these molecules just the same, and B therefore may
not acquire an interest in them against A, although his occupancy of the
water itself might well precede any act of A's in relation to those particular
molecules of water. The explanation for this must lie in the fact that A
has occupied the watercourse, and in so occupying it has acquired a private
property not merely in certain individual molecules of water but in the
whole river Wye. At this point, the idea of common property in the water
has been thoroughly destroyed, since rights in the water itself are decidedly
inferior to rights acquired in the watercourse. Actual occupancy of the
water itself now means nothing; the only rights of substance which can be
acquired are through prior occupancy of the watercourse as an entity. By
being the first to build his mill on the Wye, A has acquired a distinct
property right in each and every drop of water in the river from the time
it entered a tributary of the Wye-and perhaps even from the time it fell
from the clouds onto the watershed of that river.
The principles set forth by Blackstone represented a substantial ad-
vance over previous English water rights law. The doctrine was revolutionary
in that it clearly recognized-perhaps for the first time in the common law-
that due to the singular nature of running water, water use law involves
principles different, even radically different, from the rules governing rights
in the land itself. Certainly, in an eighteenth century England experiencing
substantial population and industrial growth, where virtually the entire
countryside was being remade, it was highly important that the test of
ancient use be abandoned and a new principle be adopted which would
allow the recognition of more modern uses.
The prior use test was not wholly successful in achieving its purpose.
Although it was a wide departure from seventeenth century law, it pos-
sessed many faults which made it less than adequate for an industrial,
urban society. Principal among these was the relatively quick ossification of
water rights which must inevitably follow the adoption of this doctrine.
Wide new possibilities for the use of watercourses may have been opened
when ancient use was abandoned, but doubtless these were rapidly appro-
priated to new uses initiated under the prior use test. If this theory is cor-
rect, during one brief period there existed great opportunities to initiate
[Vol. 28
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new uses; but after a few years the situation was probably little better
than before.
For all of the criticism which may be made of the prior use doctrine,
however, it must be recognized that a great deal of the credit for the
common law's abandonment of the doctrine of ancient use must be attrib-
uted to Blackstone and the other jurists of his time from whom he drew
his principles of water rights. Without this shift in theory, Story and Kent
would have had a much more difficult task in bringing the riparian doctrine
to Amercan law. Historically, then, Blackstone stands squarely between
the water law of Coke's day and the riparian doctrine of our own.
X. REPORTED DECISIONS: 1785 TO 1825
By the year 1785 the Industrial Revolution was in full progress in
England. New factories throughout the countryside meant greater urbaniza-
tion, and required new and increased water supplies. It was to be expected
that litigation over watercourses would increase and that the common law
relating to water use would be modified to meet the demands of a new age.
The forty years following 1785 saw considerable change in English
water law. During this time the courts moved from the doctrine of ancient
use, as employed in Brown v. Best, 86 to that of simple prior use as set
forth by Blackstone; when the year 1825 arrived, it was as though Black-
stone had been literally adopted as declaratory of English water law.
Although the doctrine of prior use was not long to remain as the guiding
principle of the common law, the fact that it was considered at all indicates
the need during this era to devise rules of water use which would aid, rather
than hinder, the further development of society. At some point in the
eighteenth century western man ceased looking solely to the past for in-
spiration and began to sense that the golden age lay in the future. Progress
became dogma; cultural thought ceased to be static and acquired a dynamic
outlook. But because the law has always been burdened with a greater
affection for the past than most human pursuits, it was very difficult for
time-honored concepts to be discarded, although they had ceased to benefit
society. In view of this, the fact that the English courts were at all able
to modify water use doctrine at the dawn of the nineteenth century is a
sizable accomplishment.
186. Supra note 79, discussed in text accompaning note 179 supra.
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Ancient use as the sole basis of water use rights had been abandoned
by the year 1785, when Robinson v. Lord Byro. 18  was decided. In that
case the defendant was enjoined from interfering with the "usual" flow of
a stream which supplied a cotton mill, apparently on the basis that the
right to modify the flow of a stream to the detriment of another user could
be acquired only through twenty years continual use. The decision clearly
indicates that the chancellor had adopted, at least in part, the theory of
prior use as governing water rights: where a downstream use is interfered
with by the subsequent initiation of an upstream use, the downstream use
is to be preferred. Having first appropriated the stream to his uses, the
lower user is to be protected.
Twenty years later the same problem came before the Court of King's
Bench in the landmark case of Bealey v. Shaw.188 In this controversy, the
defendants' predecessors had in 1724 erected a mill on the river Irwell, from
which they diverted some of the water by means of a weir and sluice, re-
turning the water to the river some distance below the mill. In 1787 the
plaintiff erected a mill on the Irwell below the defendants' mill, but above
the place where defendants returned the water to the river, so that all
water used by the defendants by-passed the plaintiff's mill. Four years
later, in 1791, defendants enlarged their sluice so as take more water for
their mill; this substantially reduced the flow of the water to the plaintiff's
mill. The defendants argued that rights to the use of water were acquired
only by prescription, i.e., twenty years use, and that plaintiff's use having
been less than twenty years, the plaintiff had no right to the use of the
water, whereas since defendants had used the water of the river in such
quantities as they saw fit for eighty years, they had gained a prescriptive
right to the entire river. The justices were unanimous in affirming a verdict
for the plaintiff, agreeing that rights to the use of water were acquired by
simple prior use, apparently to be ascertained upon a quantity principle.
Since the plaintiff, when he built his mill in 1787, had been the first to
use that part of the Irwell not diverted by defendants, he then acquired
a right that the defendants should not subsequently initiate a new use or
modify an old use which would interfere with his mill by diminishing the
quantity of water that flowed to it. As the Chief Justice, Lord Ellenborough,
said, subject to previous uses of the stream by other persons, "every man
has a right to have the advantage of a flow of water in his own land without
187. 1 Bro. Ch. 588, 28 Eng. Rep. 1315 (1785).
188. 6 East 208, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805).
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diminution or alteration." 189 Only by acquiring a prescriptive right through
twenty years adverse use could another person gain a right to use water
in a manner inconsistent with a prior initiated use.190
So far as the lower owner was concerned, therefore, the principle of
prior use was to govern as against subsequent interference by persons up-
stream. But it was uncertain as to whether this rule applied in favor of
the upper owners as well, or whether in their case a prescriptive right was
necessary to protect them from the acts of a downstream owner who
initiated a subsequent use. This question came before the Court of King's
Bench in 1818 in Saunders v. Newman, '9 which involved the raising of
a dam by a lower owner so as to flood the wheel of an upper mill. The
lower owner, defendant in the action, argued that the upper owner's right
to maintain the mill was based upon prescription and had been lost when
the mill was rebuilt in 1801 and a wheel of modified dimensions installed.
19 2
The court, however, rejected defendant's theory and held for the plaintiff,
three of the four judges asserting that through long use the plaintiff had
gained a right that the water should flow away from his mill in its usual
manner, and only the fourth judge basing his decision upon the principle
of Bealey v. Shaw, that prior use alone gave a right with which it was
wrongful to interfere. This outcome is illustrative of the uncertain state
in which English water law found itself in the opening years of the nine-
teenth century.
A somewhat similar problem arose in Wrigkt v. Howard,98 decided in
1823 in the High Court of Chancery, involving diversion of water by an
upstream owner. Ignoring the principles of prior use, the court introduced
what has been termed the "natural flow" theory:
Every proprietor has an equal right to use the water which flows in
the stream, and consequently no proprietor can have the right to
use the water to the prejudice of any other proprietor. Without
the consent of the other proprietors, who may be affected by his
operations, no proprietor can either diminish the quantity of water,
189. Id. at 214, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1269.
190. But cf. Balston v. Bensted, 1 Camp. N.P. 463, 120 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1808),
an early ground water case where the test of prescriptive use was employed.
191. 1 Barn. & Aid. 258, 106 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1818).
192. The action in this case, it should be noted, was not for flooding-which
would clearly have been wrongful-but for interfering with the operation of the
plaintiff's mill wheel, and therefore depended upon whether the plaintiff had a
right to maintain the wheel and have the water flow normally away from it.
193. 1 Sim. & St. 190, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (Ch. 1823).
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which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.191
The court held that in order to diminish the flow of the water or to throw
back the water upon the lands above, it was necessary to prove an express
grant or to establish twenty years uninterrupted enjoyment of the right.
From the opinion it would appear that this twenty years use must actually
have been adverse to the interests of some other proprietor:
It appears to me that no action will lie for diverting or throwing
back water, except by a person who sustains an actual injury,
but the action must lie at any time within twenty years when the
injury happens to arise, in consequence of a new purpose of the
party to avail himself of his common right. 95
Therefore, if this language is to be interpreted literally, no right by
prescription could ever be gained as against proprietors who might conceiva-
bly initiate a new use in the future and at that time suffer injury because
the flow of the stream was less than it originally had been. If such a theory
were adopted, use and development of water resources, other than of. a
minimal character, would be brought to a standstill, unless somehow the con-
sent of all prospectively affected persons might be acquired through an
actual grant.
But, in spite of its unhappy implications, the doctrine propounded in
Wrigh~t v. Howard is remarkable in a twofold aspect. In the first place, it
demonstrates how desperately the courts were seeking a solution to the
problem of water use in the years prior to 1825. True, this particular pro-
posal would not have been a cure; in fact, it represents one virtual extreme
in the possible doctrines which could be adopted. However, the prior use
test was not wholly successful, and apparently the courts were willing to
attempt a certain degree of experimentation in order to discover a doctrine
workable under nineteenth century conditions. Secondly, with reference to
the first quotation above, it is surprising how few changes would have to
be made in the wording of the opinion for the reasonable use test of the
present riparian doctrine to emerge. By inserting the word "unreasonably"
once in each sentence at the appropriate spot, this statement would be
the equivalent of the words employed by Mr. Justice Story just four years
later in America, in the case of Tyler v. Wilkinson, when he introduced the
principle of riparian rights to the common law world.
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Not all English courts at once concerned themselves with the possible
ramifications of the natural flow doctrine. In fact, the Court of King's Bench
was not at all influenced by the principles advocated in the High Court
of Chancery. In the 1824 decision of Williams v. Morland,90 the prior use
doctrine was approved as against a plaintiff who contended that he had a
right to the flow of all the water of a river. The three judges who decided
the Williams case, however, clearly indicated in the course of their opinions
that they were deeply concerned with the legal nature of watercourses.
Judge Bayley examined the nature of flowing water and concluded that
originally it was publici jrisr, but that when "appropriated by an individual,
his right is co-extensive with the beneficial use to which he appropriates
it."''11 An exclusive right could be acquired, although "in derogation of the
primitive right of the public";"s only the right to the unappropriated water
remained in the public.
Judge Holroyd generally agreed with Bayley, adding:
Running water is not in its nature private property. At least it is
private property no longer than it remains on the soil of the
person claiming it. Before it came there, it was clearly not his
property. It may perhaps, become, quasi, the property of another
before it comes upon his premises, by reason of his having appro-
priated to himself the use of the water accustomed to flow through
his lands before any other person had acquired a prior right to it.'19
Holroyd, clearly troubled by Blackstone's concept that property in water
was acquired only through occupancy, but that use of a watercourse gave
prior rights to the water, was thus forced to assert that flowing water,
while perhaps not private property, was at least quasi-private property.
This, of course, was wholly at variance not only with all of the time-honored
jurists but also with Blackstone himself.
Judge Littledale was more complacent than his brethren, more willing
to rely upon established principles of legal decision rather than attempt
to examine fundamentals in order to formulate a doctrine of water rights
in the light of the public need. He therefore contented himself with the
196. 2 B. & C. 910, 107 Eng. Rep. 620 (K.B. 1824).
197. Id. at 913, 107 Eng. Rep. at 621. Cf. Moore v. Rawson, 3 B. & C. 332,
336, 107 Eng. Rep. 756, 758 (K.B. 1824), in which Bayley, J., said: "The right
to light, air, or water, is acquired by enjoyment, and will, as it seems to me, con-
tinue so long as the party either continues that enjoyment or shows an intention
to continue it.'
198. Williams v. Morland, supra note 196.
199. Id. at 913, 107 Eng. Rep. at 621.
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observation that all persons have a right to use flowing water, provided
they do not actively harm those in whom water use rights have already
vested by virtue of prior use. Unless a prior user were actively injured,
however, he could not complain of uses initiated subsequently: "The mere
right to use the water does not give a party such a property in the new
water constantly coming, as to make the diversion or obstruction of the
water, per se, give him any right of acton.' '20
It is plain that the judges in Williams v. Morland were performing the
proper function of a common law court in questions involving water rights.
Ascertaining first the nature of the subject matter-watercourses-they
then asked themselves what rules of law could best be applied to water-
courses so that, in view of early nineteenth century social and economic
factors, watercourses might be employed in the most beneficial manner.
It is true that in the Williams case there was no broad departure from prior
decisions, for the principles of the earlier cases were found adequate. But,
as in the earlier case of Wright v. Howard, the thinking of the court was
profound, and in the remarks of the judges one may discover ideas which,
taken as they are or slightly modified, embody many of the fundamentals
of water law development across the next century and a quarter. Clearly,
on the eve of the promulgation of the riparian doctrine, the English courts
were groping toward substantial new development in the field of water
use rights.
Other decisions reported during this period were concerned with prob-
lems of the use of watercourses or the nature of rights which could be
acquired in them. One of these, The King v. Directors of the Bristol Dock
Co., 20 , is particularly illustrative of the relationship between citizen and
sovereign concerning the use of water. Woolfrye & Co., a brewery, took
water for brewing through pipes put into the river Avon. Pursuant to
parliamentary enactments, 20 2 the harbor of Bristol was improved, causing
a part of the Avon to be adversely affected so that its water became
"brackish and noxious," and no longer fit for brewing. Woolfrye & Co.,
forced to relocate its brewery, sought an award of C3000 under a clause of
the enactments providing for compensation of persons whose property was
rendered less valuable by the harbor improvements. Somewhat surprisingly,
the Court of King's Bench denied compensation on the ground that since
200. Id. at 914, 107 Eng. Rep. at 622.
201. 12 East 429, 104 Eng. Rep. 167 (K.B. 1810).
202. 43 Geo. 3, c. 140, and 48 Geo. 3, c. 11.
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the use of the river Avon was common to all of the king's subjects, Woolfrye
& Co. had no greater right than any other citizen to complain. The proper
remedy, said Lord Ellenborough, was indictment, since the injury was
common to all of the subjects. If the claimant here was right, then "by the
same rule if the salubrity of the air in Bristol were impaired in consequence
of the docks, every inhabitant of the place might well claim a compensa-
tion." 20 Judge Le Blanc added that Woolfrye & Co. had "no more claim
to compensation under the Act than every inhabitant of Bristol would have
who had been used to dip a pail into the river for water for the use of his
house.'124 Here the concept of the public interest in watercourses was car-
ried to an extreme; it was so embracing that all private interests were
swallowed up by it. This strongly indicates that on public rivers in England,
at least, the public right was always recognized as being supreme, to the
exclusion or extinguishment of any conflicting private rights. On the other
hand, non-navigable rivers were largely regarded as private property, which
could be conveyed relatively freely, so long as the rights of other persons
were observed.2 0 5
The concept that any member of the public could use water, a great
egalitarian idea respecting natural resources, received a substantial setback
in 1821, when it was held that no common law right existed allowing the
public to pass over private lands in order to gain access to the sea.20 0 A
majority of the Court of King's Bench, quite evidently referring to water-
courses as well as the sea, held that a common right of access was irrecon-
cilable with the nature of private property in land. Judge Best, on the other
hand, argued "on principles of public policy, I might say public necessity,
that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance.20 7
The decision should be no surprise in view of the exalted position which
English law has always accorded a man's freehold and in the light of
earlier cases holding that upon the banks of public rivers no public right
of landing or towing existed. 20 If the public is generally denied access to
common property, little use can be made of it. Given this denial of access,
it was only natural that in later decades an effort was made, with remark-
203. 12 East at 432, 104 Eng. Rep. at 169.
204. Ibid.
205. See, e.g., Mayor of Carlisle v. Blamire, 8 East 487, 103 Eng. Rep. 430
(K.B. 1807), involving the conveyance of a part of the river Caldew to the city
of Carlisle to be used to power the city's corn mills.
206. Blundell v. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Ald. 268, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1821).
207. Id. at 287, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
208. See Ball v. Herbert, 3 T.R. 253, 100 Eng. Rep. 560 (KB. 1789).
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able success, to deny completely to the public any rights in non-navigable
rivers.
Flooding of lands caused by milldams and weirs continued to be some-
thing of a problem during this period, but the rules of law in this regard
remained well settled.20 9 Due to the increased building of structures in
streams, the upstream passage of salmon and other commercially valuable
fish was interfered with, and persons possessing fishing interests were gen-
erally successful in collecting damages for these interferences.210 But the
fishing interests were not so successful when they asserted that navigators
must not moor their ships in fishing beds; the courts reminded the fishermen
that the public interest was superior to their private right.21" Navigators,
in turn, were again denied the right to use the banks of navigable rivers
to tow their vessels,2 ' 2 but were permitted to use the land between high
and low water marks as a place for their towpaths.213 And it was held that
navigators might moor their barges to the wharves or banks of a river
if they could prove a custom allowing them to do S0.214
All things considered, during the period from 1785 to 1825 the courts
continued to recognize the principles laid down in earlier times with regard
to navigation, fishing, and instances of flooding of lands. These principles
were retained largely because they continued to prove operable and rel-
atively just. On the other hand, so far as uses of streams for power or
consumptive purposes were concerned, the earlier doctrines were questioned
and modified, primarily because the change in the economic and social
structure had begun to make the old rules, designed for a static, rural
society, unworkable. Modification of the established order became neces-
sary; property rights in watercourses had to be reshaped by the courts.
This was to be finally accomplished in later years, largely due to the
adoption of American developments in the law of water rights.2 5
209. Cooper v. Barber, 3 Taunt. 99, 128 Eng. Rep. 40 (C.P. 1810); Alder v.
Savill, 5 Taunt. 454, 128 Eng. Rep. 766 (C.P. 1814).
210. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Marquis of Donegall, 3 Ridg. Parl. Rep. 267 (Ire.
1795); Weld v. Hornby, 7 East 195, 103 Eng. Rep. 75 (1806).
211. Anonymous, Durham Assizes, 1808, reported in a footnote in Phillimore
v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513, 517, 128 Eng. Rep. 1040, 1042 (N.P. 1808).
212. Ball v. Herbert, supra note 208.
213. The King v. Smith, Dougl. 441, 99 Eng. Rep. 283 (K.B. 1780).
214. Wyatt v. Thompson, 1 Esp. 252, 170 Eng. Rep. 347 (1794).
215. It should also be noted that during this period pleading grew to be far
more liberal than it had been in earlier times, and became, as it properly should
be, a means of framing issues for decision, rather than itself the principal subject
of controversy. Cf. Fitzsimons v. Inglis, 5 Taunt. 534, 128 Eng. Rep. 798 (C.P.
1814); Griffiths v. Marson, 6 Price 1, 146 Eng. Rep. 723 (1818); Shears v. Wood,
7 Moore 345 (1822).
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XI. CONCLUSION
This, then, was the status of English water use law in 1825, imme-
diately before Story and Kent conceived the riparian doctrine on the
western shore of the Atlantic. In the years following 1825, the English
courts were to abandon prior use as the crucial test and to embrace
in its stead the "natural flow" doctrine of Wrigkt v. Howard.216 But the
era of natural flow was to be short-lived, for in 1851 the Court of Exchequer,
in Embrey v. Owen,217 was to adopt from American law the riparian
doctrine with its basis of reasonable use.
In 1825 the common law contained the seeds of the reasonable use
test; the development across the centuries had been in the direction of a
flexible legal standard which would enable the greatest beneficial use of
watercourses. 21 Story and Kent were unquestionably conversant with this
common law background. It is true, of course, that in constructing the
riparian doctrine they drew heavily upon the Code Napoleon and Roman
law. But at most the continental legal system can be assigned only a paternal
role in the conception of the American riparian doctrine. The gestation
of the doctrine occurred within the matrix of the common law, over centuries
of judicial experience and growth.
216. In the 1833 King's Bench decision of Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & A. 1, 110 Eng.
Rep. 692, the natural flow doctrine of Wright v. Howard was restated, and its
basis laid as early as Cox v. Mathews, 1 Ventris 237, 239, 86 Eng. Rep. 159, 160
(1673). The doctrine was approved by way of dictum by the Court of Exchequer
Chamber in Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch. Ch.
1843).
217. 6 Exch. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. Ch. 1851).
218. The English courts were not unaware of the Roman law of watercourses.
For instance, in 1833, in Mason v. Hill, supra note 216, at 23-25, 110 Eng. Rep. at
700-01, Denman, C. J., referred to and quoted from Vinnius and the Institutes and
Digest of Justinian in discussing the nature of the public interest in watercourses.
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